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STATE VEHICLE ELECTRIFICATION
MANDATES AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Matthew N. Metz* and Janelle London†
ABSTRACT
By requiring that new vehicles sold after a certain date be electric, states can lower
drivers’ vehicle operating costs, boost local employment, and lower electric rates. But
there’s a widespread perception that states can’t take advantage of these opportunities
because a state vehicle electrification mandate would be preempted by federal law.
Not so.
While the Federal Clean Air Act (CAA) prohibits state regulations “relating to” the
control of emissions in motor vehicles, and the Federal Energy Policy and Conservation
Act (EPCA) prohibits state regulations “related to” fuel economy standards, there is a
strong rationale for federal courts to reject preemption of state vehicle electrification
mandates.
The Supreme Court has indicated repeatedly that state laws regulating a product or
process “upstream” that have an effect “downstream” are not preempted by the federal
law. A state law conditioning construction of nuclear power plants on adequate means for
storage and disposal of nuclear waste is not preempted by a federal law regulating nuclear
plant safety, although its effect is to advance nuclear plant safety. A state ban on uranium
mining is not preempted by a federal law on uranium milling and tailing safety, although
its effect is to advance uranium milling and tailing safety. Similarly, a state law requiring
that cars run on electricity should not be preempted by federal law on emissions and fuel
economy standards, although its effect is to reduce emissions and improve fuel economy.
Moreover, there is no conflict between a state vehicle electrification law and the purposes
of the CAA and EPCA. The purpose of the Clean Air Act is to clean the air. The
relevant purpose of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act is to reduce energy demand.
Neither statute has a purpose of ensuring that new vehicles have at least some emissions,
nor that they continue to use gasoline.
This Article concludes that state vehicle electrification legislation should not be
preempted. Neither the CAA nor the EPCA directly regulates how vehicles are powered.
Neither statute explicitly prohibits states from mandating electrification of vehicles. And
legal precedent limiting regulation of vehicles based on emissions or fuel economy
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standards has never addressed vehicle electrification mandates.
Further, states have compelling reasons for vehicle electrification mandates that have
nothing to do with regulating emissions or improving fuel economy standards. Such
reasons may be sufficient to avoid preemption. The Supreme Court’s increasingly
preemption-skeptical jurisprudence, as articulated in Virginia Uranium v. Warren,
limits courts’ ability to scrutinize state motives in passing vehicle electrification statutes.
Thus, although preemption cannot be dismissed as a concern, the stage has been set
for state-based vehicle electrification mandates.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Transportation is the largest source of carbon pollution in the United States,
2
most of it from burning gasoline in light duty vehicles. Gasoline is also the largest
source of air pollutants, particularly carbon monoxide and smog-forming nitrogen
3
oxide (NOx). More than 15,600 U.S. deaths were caused by gasoline vehicle emis4
sions in 2015 alone. Vehicle emissions have been linked to asthma, heart and lung
disease, cancers and dementia, as well as adolescent anxiety, depression, and dimin5
ished academic performance.
6
Electric vehicles (EVs) are already a viable substitute for most gasoline7
powered light-duty vehicles, and for certain classes of heavy-duty vehicles such as
8
transit buses. In the San Jose, California area, about 21% of 2018 new car purchas1. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Nov. 26, 2019). For purposes of this Article, the term “gasoline” is used to include gasoline and diesel fuel.
2. See Fast Facts on Transportation Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/fast-facts-transportation-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited
Nov. 26, 2019).
3. See Pollutants and Health, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/
emissions_pollutants.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
SUSAN ANENBERG ET AL., INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., A GLOBAL SNAPSHOT
AIR POLLUTION-RELATED HEALTH IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION SECTOR EMISSIONS IN
2010
AND
2015
at
19
(2019),
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Global_health_impacts_transport_emissions_2010-2015_20190226.pdf.
4.

OF THE

5. See What’s So Bad About Gasoline?, COLTURA, https://www.coltura.org/gasfacts (last visited
Nov. 9, 2019) (collecting sources).
6. See, e.g., Kyle Hyatt & Steven Ewing, Here’s Every Electric Vehicle on Sale in the U.S. for 2020
and its Range, CNET (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/roadshow/news/every-electric-car-evrange-audi-chevy-tesla/.
7. Light duty vehicles are defined by the U.S. Federal Highway Administration as vehicles
with weight under 10,000 pounds, a classification that includes passenger vehicles and light trucks. Vehicle Weight Classes & Categories, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10380 (last updated
June 2012); Fleet Application for Public Transit Vehicles, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, https://afdc.energy.gov/
vehicle-applications/public-transit, (last visited Nov. 26, 2019); All Electric Vehicles, U.S. DEP’T
ENERGY, https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_basics_ev.html, (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
8. See, e.g., Heavy-Duty, GREEN CAR CONGRESS, https://www.greencarcongress.com/
heavyduty/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2020).
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9

es were electric. Nationally, about 2% of new car sales were electric vehicles in
10
2018.
Mass adoption of electric vehicles will significantly lower air pollution and
11
carbon emissions. In addition, electric vehicles provide lower vehicle operating
12
13
costs and apply downward pressure on electric rates for all utility ratepayers.
The conflict between states pursuing more aggressive climate and air pollution
control policies and a Trump Administration seeking to roll back national fuel effi14
ciency standards and state vehicle emission requirements is moving to the courts.
The Trump Administration’s proposed revocation of California’s longstanding authority to 1) set stricter emissions standards than the federal government under the
Clean Air Act and 2) require a rising number of zero emission vehicles, is now the
subject of a challenge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
brought by California and twenty-two other states, and the cities of New York and
15
Los Angeles. And states are advancing new climate policies, including plans to
reduce carbon emissions and other air pollutants from motor vehicles, inde16
pendently of the federal government.
In the state of Washington, legislation requiring electrification of new private
vehicles by 2030 is expected to be introduced in January 2021. The proposed bill,
17
similar to a bill that was introduced in 2020, requires that model year 2030 or

9. INT’L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., THE SURGE OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES IN UNITED
STATES
CITIES
7
(June
2019),
https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/
ICCT_EV_surge_US_cities_20190610.pdf.
10. Loren McDonald, US EV Sales Surpass 2% in 2018—9 EV Sales Charts, CLEANTECHNICA (Jan.
12, 2019), https://cleantechnica.com/2019/01/12/us-ev-sales-surpass-2-for-2018-8-more-sales-charts/.
11. Julianne Beck & Amanda Morris, Electric Vehicle Adoption Improves Air Quality and Climate
Outlook, PHYS.ORG (Apr. 12, 2019), https://phys.org/news/2019-04-electric-vehicle-air-quality-climate.html.
12. MICHAEL SIVAK & BRANDON SCHOETTLE, RELATIVE COSTS OF DRIVING ELECTRIC
GASOLINE VEHICLES IN THE INDIVIDUAL U.S. STATES 3 (2018), http://www.umich.edu/
~umtriswt/PDF/SWT-2018-1.pdf.
AND

13. JASON FROST, MELISSA WHITED & AVI ALLISON, ELECTRIC VEHICLES ARE DRIVING
ELECTRIC RATES DOWN 4 (2019), https://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/EVs-DrivingRates-Down-8-122.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Editorial Board, Opinion, Rather Than Compromise on Fuel-Efficiency Standards, the
Trump Administration May Force Years of Litigation, WASH. POST (July 27, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rather-than-compromise-on-fuel-efficiency-standards-thetrump-administration-may-force-years-of-litigation/2019/07/27/bd7d3362-afda-11e9-a0c96d2d7818f3da_story.html.
15. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, 7, California v. Chao, No. 1:19-cv02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/California%
20v.%20Chao%20complaint%20%2800000002%29.pdf.
16. See Brad Plumer, Blue States Roll Out Aggressive Climate Strategies. Red States Keep to the Sidelines,
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/climate/states-climate-change.html.
17. H.B. 2515, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). A hearing was held on the bill in the House
Transportation Committee, but the bill did not advance.
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later light-duty vehicles sold in the state be powered by electricity. It asserts
numerous reasons for requiring vehicle electrification, none of which relates to
emissions or fuel economy standards. These reasons include: job creation;
economic development; savings to Washington state consumers on vehicle
maintenance and electric rates; power load balancing and energy storage for the
electric grid; protection of plants, fish, and wildlife from polluted stormwater
runoff; and avoidance of toxic vapor releases and soil and groundwater
19
contamination. None of these reasons conflicts with the purposes of the Federal
20
21
Clean Air Act or the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
This Article analyzes the proposed Washington legislation to explore the
broader question of whether a state (or a political subdivision of a state such as an
air quality management district, county, or city) could enact vehicle electrification
laws, regulations, or local rules that could withstand a preemption challenge under
22
the CAA and EPCA.
A preemption challenge to a law such as the proposed Washington vehicle
23
electrification mandate is a virtual certainty. The legal issues involved in a
preemption challenge would be a case of first impression—no state has previously
24
enacted a 100% vehicle electrification mandate. Proponents of preemption would
likely base their case on language in CAA § 209(a), prohibiting state regulation

18. Draft bill concerning the electrification of transportation (2020), https://tinyurl.com/WAEVBILL
2021 (on file with authors).
19.

Id.

20.

Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(a)(3), (b)(1), (c) (2018).

21.

42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2018).

22. The state of California alone has been given the explicit ability to set stricter vehicle emissions standards than those set by federal law. California was written into the Clean Air Act in a way
that allowed the state to request a waiver from the administrator of the EPA to curtail tailpipe emissions more restrictively than what the federal government allows. Accordingly, the EPA administrator
is required by law to grant the waiver to California if the state’s emissions standards are “at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012).
The Trump Administration has moved to revoke that ability. Ryan Beene et. al., Trump Moving Forward to End California’s Authority to Set Clean-Air Standards, Mandate Electric-Car Sales, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-california-clean-air-20180723-story.html.
23. See James B. Slaughter & James M. Auslander, Preemption Litigation Strategies Under Environmental Law, 22 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 18, 18-19 (“Environmental law is a rich field for preemption
disputes . . . .”).
24. Ten states have joined California’s Zero Emissions Vehicles program, enacted pursuant to
the waiver provided by the Clean Air Act section 209(a). However, that program is different from a
vehicle electrification mandate, in that it puts the onus on automakers to earn a certain number of credits for stocking zero emissions vehicles (usually electric vehicles) at dealerships in the state, or purchase
excess credits from another automaker, or pay a fine. Currently the credit requirement amounts to
about 2.5% of the automaker’s vehicles, and that figure rises to about 8% by 2025. See generally What Is
ZEV?, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/what-zev
(last updated Sept. 12, 2019).
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25

“relating to the control of emissions” in motor vehicles, and on an EPCA provi26
sion prohibiting state regulation “related to” fuel economy standards.
There are multiple ways courts could uphold a state vehicle electrification
mandate consistent with existing preemption precedent. The CAA regulates vehicle emissions; EPCA regulates “fuel economy standards.” As described in detail
below, defenders of the legislation can point to its lack of reference to vehicle emissions or fuel economy standards, its basis in strong non-emissions, non-fueleconomy grounds for electrification, the broad authority states have over in-state
electricity regulation, and growing judicial disfavor for preemption.
This Article concludes that there is a path for the Washington vehicle electrification mandate to avoid preemption under existing precedent. Nonetheless, the
outcome of a preemption challenge to the proposed Washington legislation is unclear. Preemption doctrine is highly case-specific. A ruling on preemption would
likely turn on the extent to which a court finds conflict between the Washington
legislation and the CAA and EPCA. Much will depend on judicial interpretation
of the breadth to be accorded to the “related to” preemption language in the CAA
27
and EPCA.
The success of a preemption challenge will also hinge on the ideological bent
of the court considering it and the perceived urgency to address the climate crisis
at the time that the preemption challenge is considered. The Ninth Circuit, where
the challenge to Washington legislation would initially be reviewed, has tended to
be sympathetic to pro-climate legislation and resistant to federal preemption of en28
vironmental statutes. However, with the appointments to the Ninth Circuit
29
bench made by the Trump administration, that may be changing.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I introduces the concept of vehicle
electrification legislation in the context of the Washington bill and details existing
vehicle electrification efforts internationally and in the U.S. Part II examines the
CAA and EPCA, the Washington bill and relevant preemption case law, and concludes that federal statutes and precedent do not require preemption of state vehicle electrification mandates. Part III examines preemption through the lens of the
Supreme Court’s evolving narrow, text-based, and formalist preemption jurisprudence, as recently articulated in Virginia Uranium v. Warren, and concludes that ex-

25.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).

26.

49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2012).

27.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a); 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a).

28. See Ryan Ichinaga, State Activism in the Movement to Conserve Sharks: The Ninth Circuit’s
Guidance on Preemption and the Magnuson-Stevens Act in “Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris”, 46
ENVT’L L. 679, 704-05 (2016).
29. See Susannah Luthi, How Trump is Filling the Liberal 9th Circuit With Conservatives,
POLITICO (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/22/trump-judges-9th-circuit-appealscourt-088833.
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isting federal legislation should not preempt vehicle electrification mandates under
state law.

I. OVERVIEW OF VEHICLE ELECTRIFICATION MANDATES
A. The Need for Vehicle Electrification Policy
Gasoline is the single largest source of carbon dioxide (CO2) pollution in the
30
United States. In 2018, U.S. gasoline and diesel consumption for transportation
resulted in emissions of about 1,600 million metric tons of CO2, roughly two-thirds
31
of which was from gasoline. Gasoline and diesel emissions constituted 81% of total U.S. transportation sector CO2 emissions and 30% of total U.S. energy-related
32
CO2 emissions. Gasoline usage has reached an all-time high of 3.4 billion barrels
33
per year from 2016 to 2018.
Electric vehicles (EVs) are capable of replacing gasoline-powered cars as the
predominant mode of mobility and drastically lowering transportation-sector CO2
34
emissions. Thanks to plummeting costs of wind and solar power, replacement of
35
traditional fuels with renewable sources is more practicable than ever. EVs offer
36
superior performance to comparable gas-powered vehicles. Some EV models are
already at cost parity with comparable gasoline vehicles on a lifetime cost of ownership basis—that is, accounting not only for the purchase price but also savings in
37
fuel costs and maintenance over the lifetime of the vehicle. Sticker prices for EVs

30. Where Greenhouse Gases Come From, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/index.php?page=environment_where_ghg_come_from (last updated July 20, 2018).
31. How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced from U.S. Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Consumption?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=307&t=11 (last updated May 15,
2019).
32.

Id.

33. Petroleum & Other Liquids: Product Supplied, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 31, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_cons_psup_a_EPM0F_VPP_mbbl_a.htm.
34. See generally How Clean Is Your Electric Vehicle?, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 25,
2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/electric-vehicles/ev-emissions-tool.
35. See Megan Mahajan, Plunging Prices Mean Building New Renewable Energy Is Cheaper Than
Running Existing Coal, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2018/12/
03/plunging-prices-mean-building-new-renewable-energy-is-cheaper-than-running-existing-coal/.
36. IDAHO NAT’L LAB., HOW DO GASOLINE & ELECTRIC VEHICLES COMPARE? at 2,
https://avt.inl.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/fsev/compare.pdf.
37. NIC LUTSEY & MICHAEL NICHOLAS, UPDATE ON ELECTRIC VEHICLE COSTS IN THE
UNITED STATES THROUGH 2030 at 10 (Int’l Council on Clean Transp., Working Paper No. 2019-06,
2019), https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/EV_cost_2020_2030_20190401.pdf.
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are expected to reach cost parity with comparable gasoline vehicles by the mid38
39
2020s, and in several vehicle segments are already lower.
Recent studies have also calculated powerful economic benefits of widespread
40
vehicle electrification unrelated to vehicle emissions. New York, for example,
could realize $75 billion in net present value from vehicle electrification in a scenario in which electric vehicle penetration reaches 27% of all registered vehicles by
41
2030 and 92% by 2050. $34.1 billion of these benefits would accrue to EV owners
in the form of reduced annual operating costs, and $24.3 billion would accrue to
42
electric utility customers in the form of reduced electric bills. Other nonemissions-related benefits of EVs include using locally generated electricity to
43
power automobiles, retaining money in-state that would normally be spent on
44
45
46
gasoline, providing load balancing, storage and resilience resources to the

38. Nathaniel Bullard, Electric Car Price Tag Shrinks Along with Battery Cost, BLOOMBERGNEF
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://about.bnef.com/blog/bullard-electric-car-price-tag-shrinks-along-battery-cost/.
39. Supply: Model Availability and Price Discrepancy Between EVs and ICE Vehicles Remain a Top
Hurdle To Mass Adoption in the US, EVADOPTION (May 19, 2019), https://evadoption.com/supplymodel-availability-and-price-discrepancy-between-evs-and-ice-vehicles-remain-a-top-hurdle-to-massadoption/.
40. See, e.g., DANA LOWELL, BRIAN JONES & DAVID SEAMONDS, ELECTRIC VEHICLE COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 21 (2016), https://mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/NY_PEV_CB_Analysis_FINAL.pdf.
41.

Id. at 5-6.

42. Id. Electric vehicles tend to charge overnight when there is spare capacity on the grid. They
result in increased utilization of existing electrical infrastructure with relatively little additional marginal cost. As such, EVs increase utility revenues more than they increase utility costs, leading to downward pressure on rates. JASON FROST, MELISSA WHITED, & AVI ALLISON, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON.
INC., ELECTRIC VEHICLES ARE DRIVING ELECTRIC RATES DOWN 3-4 (2019), https://www.synapseenergy.com/sites/default/files/EV-Impacts-June-2019-18-122.pdf.
43. Michela Longo, Federica Foiadelli & Wahiba Yaïci, Electric Vehicles Integrated with Renewable Energy Sources for Sustainable Mobility, in NEW TRENDS IN ELECTRICAL VEHICLE POWERTRAINS
203, 205 (Luis Romeral Martinez & Miguel Delgado Prieto eds., 2019), https://www.intechopen.com/
books/new-trends-in-electrical-vehicle-powertrains/electric-vehicles-integrated-with-renewable-energysources-for-sustainable-mobility.
44. See NEXT10, CLEAN TRANSPORTATION: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF MORE
INCLUSIVE VEHICLE ELECTRIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA 46-47, https://www.next10.org/sites/default/
files/2020-01/clean-transportation-ev-benefits-final.pdf; see also JAMES J. WINEBRAKE, ERIN H. GREEN
& EDWARD CARR, PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES: ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND EMPLOYMENT
GROWTH: PRELIMINARY FINAL REPORT 10-14 (2017), https://caletc.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/
05/EERA-PEV-Economic-Impacts-and-Employment-Growth.pdf.
45.
See generally JEFFERY GREENBLATT ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
QUANTIFYING THE POTENTIAL OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES TO PROVIDE ELECTRIC GRID BENEFITS TO
THE MISO A REA , https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Quantifying%20the%20Potential%20of%20Electric%20
Vehicles%20to%20Provide%20Electric%20Grid%20Benefits%20in%20the%20MISO%20Area354192.pdf
(last visited May 11, 2020).
46.

ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., ENHANCING GRID RESILIENCE WITH INTEGRATED STORAGE
ELECTRIC VEHICLES (June 2018), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/06/f53/
EAC_Enhancing%20Grid%20Resilience%20with%20Integrated%20Storage%20from%20EVs%20%28Ju
ne%202018%29.pdf.

FROM
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electric grid, spurring economic development in new technologies, creating new
48
jobs directly and indirectly related to transportation electrification, tempering oil
49
lobby influence, protecting natural habitats by reducing oil exploration and
50
51
spills, reducing noise pollution, and reducing volumes of petroleum leaked from
52
underground storage tanks and motor vehicles.
Despite these benefits, electric car sales represent only about 2% of all U.S.
53
new car sales , with most of those sales in 2019 coming from one manufacturer:
54
Tesla. A handful of factors have prevented a more rapid uptake of electric vehicles: higher sticker price, consumer anxiety about vehicle range, insufficient charg55
ing infrastructure, and charging speed. Additional factors are consumer comfort
56
57
with gasoline vehicles, a shortage of electric vehicle models in key categories,
58
and poor sales and advertising efforts by manufacturers and dealers.
Policies designed to accelerate the transition to EVs can be helpful, including
EV purchase/lease incentive programs (especially if targeted at low- and moderate-

47.

See Longo, Foiadelli & Yaïci, supra note 43, at 209-18.

48. See NEXT10, supra note 44, at 37-38; Ingrid Malmgren, Quantifying the Societal Benefits of
Electric Vehicles, 721 WORLD ELEC. VEHICLE J. 996, 1001 (2016).
49. See Michael J. Mishak, Big Oil’s Grip on California, REVEAL (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://www.revealnews.org/article/big-oils-grip-on-california/.
50. See The Hidden Costs of Fossil Fuels, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/hidden-cost-of-fossils.
51. See Hector Campello-Vicente et al., The Effect of Electric Vehicles on Urban Noise Maps, 116
APPLIED ACOUSTICS 59, 64 (2017).
52. See Hilary Nixon & Jean-Daniel Saphores, Impacts of Motor Vehicle Operation on Water
Quality in the US – Cleanup Costs and Policies, 12 TRANSP. RES. PART D: TRANSPORT & ENV’T 564
(2007), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2007.08.002.
53. Russ Mitchell, Car Buyers Shun Electric Vehicles Not Named Tesla. Are Carmakers Driving Off a
Cliff?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-01-17/ev-sales-fizzle.
54. Zachary Shahan, Tesla Gobbled Up 78% of US Electric Vehicle Sales in 2019, CLEAN TECHNICA
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://cleantechnica.com/2020/01/16/tesla-gobbled-up-81-of-us-electric-vehicle-salesin-2019/.
55. CB INSIGHTS, THE RACE FOR THE ELECTRIC CAR 16-21 (2019),
https://www.cbinsights.com/reports/CB-Insights_Electric-Car-Race.pdf?utm_campaign=electric-carrace_2019-05&utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_wMLvy63e8WqeghQLb2bkSJw6bEYycPqXl_
DXe65I1pd8Bs17D0x4iEGY2-beB6wHwqFgn3u1rfO5ItfpNB7tW7xT42_XYV5OfA6jBVi_
WzZz4ke4&_hsmi=73210674&utm_source=hs_automation&utm_content=73210674&hsCtaTracking=
a2e34b17-025e-4b46-978c-7994f556a087%7C31d25a0a-0003-41a4-9595-67363ac5000c.
56.

Id.

57. However, concern about model availability is diminishing as automakers have plans for
about 400 electric vehicles models to enter the market by 2025. See MCKINSEY & CO., THE ROAD
AHEAD FOR E-MOBILITY 4, 14 (Jan. 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/
automotive%20and%20assembly/our%20insights/the%20road%20ahead%20for%20e%20mobility/theroad-ahead-for-e-mobility.ashx.
58. SIERRA CLUB, A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF THE ELECTRIC VEHICLE SHOPPING
EXPERIENCE 9 (Nov. 2019), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/press-room/
2153%20Rev%20Up%20Report%202019_3_web.pdf.
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59

income consumers) and carbon taxes. But EV sales incentives, in which the gov60
ernment pays a portion of the vehicle purchase price, can burden a state’s budget,
61
62
and carbon taxes have failed to gain political traction at the federal or state levels. Most importantly, these policies are unlikely to be sufficient to spur investment at the rate necessary for rapid transition to EVs, nor to assure the drastic re63
duction in gasoline use necessary to avert the worst impacts of the climate crisis.
The long-term sales trend for EVs is the subject of much debate. The Edison
Foundation, using projections from five independent forecasts, developed a consensus forecast that EV sales will account for about 22% of new car sales in the
64
U.S. by 2030. Given that there are about 256 million passenger vehicles on U.S.
65
66
roads, and that their average age is 11.5 years, more than 90% of cars on the
road would still be powered by gasoline in 2030 in the event that the consensus EV
growth forecast is accurate.
So what can be done? Many countries are announcing plans to implement
67
gasoline vehicle phaseout policies. A gasoline vehicle phaseout requires only sales
of zero emissions vehicles, or prohibits sales of new gasoline-powered vehicles, after a date certain—for instance, it might prohibit sales of new gasoline-powered
cars beginning with model year 2030. Battery electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel
cell electric vehicles are the most common types of vehicles other than vehicles
with tailpipe emissions that typically run on gasoline or diesel. In countries announcing plans to phase out gasoline vehicles, the plan is that zero-emission elec-

59. UC DAVIS, IMPACT OF THE CLEAN VEHICLE REBATE PROJECT’S INCREASED REBATES
FOR LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME INDIVIDUALS ON CALIFORNIA’S ZEV MARKET 4-6 (May
2019), https://policyinstitute.ucdavis.edu/wp-content/uploads/CVRP_Rebates_0519.pdf.
60. See, e.g., Michael J. Coren, A California Program to Put the Masses in Electric Cars May Cost
$14 Billion, QUARTZ (Dec. 21, 2018), https://qz.com/1499245/ev-price/.
61. Cf. Miranda Green, Carbon Tax Shows New Signs of Life in Congress, HILL (July 26, 2019),
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/454819-carbon-tax-shows-new-signs-of-life-in-congress.
62. David Roberts, Washington Votes No on a Carbon Tax—Again, VOX (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/9/28/17899804/washington-1631-results-carbonfee-green-new-deal.
63. See Joeri Rogelj et al., Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable
Development, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C at 93, 95 (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018)
(describing IPCC position that a 45% CO2 decline by 2030 relative to 2010 is needed to keep warming
within 1.5 °C).
64. ADAM COOPER & KELLEN SCHEFTER, EDISON FOUND. INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION &
EDISON ELEC. INST., REPORT: ELECTRIC VEHICLE SALES FORECAST AND THE CHARGING
INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED THROUGH 2030 (2018), https://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/
publications/Documents/IEI_EEI%20EV%20Forecast%20Report_Nov2018.pdf.
65. Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP.:
BUREAU TRANSP. STAT. (May 30, 2019), https://www.bts.gov/content/number-us-aircraft-vehiclesvessels-and-other-conveyances.
66. Scott Vaughan, Average Lifespan for U.S. Vehicles, BERLA (Nov. 16, 2016), https://berla.co/
average-us-vehicle-lifespan/.
67.

See supra Section I.B.
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68

tric vehicles will take their place, making these gasoline vehicle phaseout policies
essentially vehicle electrification mandates.
Vehicle electrification mandates are prospective; cars manufactured prior to
the phaseout date are not affected. Such mandates allow for industrial planning
and accommodate a transition period. They provide a stronger policy that’s more
certain to achieve the intended result than relying on market forces alone. And
they are becoming popular around the world. Zero emission vehicle requirements
have emerged in more than fifteen countries as a preferred strategy to accelerate
69
and assure the transition away from gasoline.
As discussed below, vehicle electrification mandates are an attractive policy
option for the U.S. as well, because they provide the market certainty needed to
accelerate large, long-term investment in vehicle and battery technology, EV
charging infrastructure, the electrical grid, and public awareness. Vehicle electrification mandates will shift investment away from oil production and further development of gas-powered vehicles.

B. Implementation of Vehicle Electrification Policies Abroad
Eighteen countries or regions are implementing or planning mandates to
speed the trend toward vehicle electrification. While the terms of these policies
vary, they all function by restricting the sale of new gasoline-powered cars, and
most of them contemplate a 2030 target date.
Countries or regions have announced plans, policies, or laws to phase out sales
of new gasoline cars by 2025 (Norway), 2030 (Denmark, Germany, Iceland, India,
Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Slovenia, and Sweden), or 2040 (British Columbia,
70
Egypt, France, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom). In
71
Norway, already more than 42% of all new cars sold are electric. China, the
72
world’s largest market, is considering a ban on fossil fuel vehicles and is imple-

68. See, e.g., Magdelena Dugdale, European Countries Banning Fossil Fuels and Switching to Electric,
ROAD TRAFFIC TECH. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.roadtraffic-technology.com/features/europeancountries-banning-fossil-fuel-cars/. For the purposes of this article, it is assumed that where gasoline
vehicles are phased out, electric ones will take their place.
69.

See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.

70. Gasoline Vehicle Phaseout Advances Around the World, COLTURA, https://www.coltura.org/
world-gasoline-phaseouts (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
71. See Mikael Holter, Tesla Record Pushes Norway’s Share of Electric Car Sales to 42%,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-03/tesla-recordpushes-norway-s-share-of-electric-car-sales-to-42.
72. See, e.g., Jill Shen, After False Starts, China Reaffirms Plans to Phase Out Fossil Fuels,
TECHNODE (Aug. 22, 2019), https://technode.com/2019/08/22/miit-ban-fossil-fuel-update/.
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menting restrictions on new gasoline cars in other ways, such as by applying strict
73
vehicle licensing quotas.

C. Rationales for Vehicle Electrification Policy
1. Market Certainty Rationale
Merely selling more electric cars isn’t enough to sustain a robust electric vehicle-based transportation system. Huge public and private investments in vehicles,
the electric grid, and charging infrastructure are also needed to provide the wide
choice of vehicle models and ability to travel long distances that drivers expect.
A vehicle electrification mandate creates the critical mass of electric vehicles
on the road required to ensure returns from investing in electric vehicle technology
and charging. Electric vehicles and electric-vehicle technology are subject to net74
work effects —an economic phenomenon in which the value of a particular good
75
depends on the extent of adoption of that good by others. Network effects are
76
particularly strong for goods that depend on an underlying infrastructure. For
example, an individual owner might be able to install a private charging station at
her home, but will not be able to travel past her vehicle’s range if there are no public charging stations available on the road. Likewise, it makes little economic sense
for an owner of gas stations or parking lots to install charging stations across its
properties without the certainty that there will be customers to use them. Network
effects explain why the electric automaker Tesla decided to allow other manufac77
turers to use its patented technology. The advantages of owning a Tesla grow as
the overall electric car market and associated charging infrastructure grows.

73. E.g., Samuel Shen & Adam Jourdan, Beijing Slashes Car Sales Quota in Anti-pollution Drive,
SCI. AM. (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/beijing-slashes-car-sales-quota-tocut-pollution/.
74. E.g., Shanjun Li et al., The Market for Electric Vehicles: Indirect Network Effects and Policy Design, 4 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS 89 (2017) (demonstrating network effects in electric-vehicle markets and proposing policy interventions based on analysis); Zhe Yua et al., Market Dynamics and Indirect Network Effects in Electric Vehicle Diffusion, 47 TRANSP. RES. PART D 336 (2016)
(observing, among other things, that the free market results in underinvestment in electric vehicles).
75. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 93-97 (1994).
76. Network effects were a strong contributor to the triumph of the VCR over the Betamax in
the 1970s and 1980s, despite the Betamax arguably being the superior technology. See, e.g., James Currier, The Network Effects Manual: 13 Different Network Effects (and Counting), MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://medium.com/@nfx/the-network-effects-manual-13-different-network-effects-and-countinga3e07b23017d. Telephones provide another good illustration of network effects. One phone by itself is
not a particularly useful device. Greater adoption of telephones both makes each individual phone more
useful and spreads the cost of telephone lines and other supporting infrastructure across more users.
77. See Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA (June 12, 2014),
https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
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Legal and market uncertainty, then, is a major sticking point in the transition
to an all-electric system. A vehicle electrification policy would provide certainty to
key market participants that a fully-electric new vehicle market would reward their
investment.
Without the certainty created by an electrification mandate, market participants would be likely to hedge their bets. Automakers might question the size of
the electric vehicle market and whether the charging infrastructure buildout will be
sufficient to power EVs. Landlords might hesitate to install charging infrastructure, concerned about whether there would be enough EV drivers to justify the
cost. And utilities might delay grid upgrades for the same reason. This hedging
could significantly delay growth of the electric vehicle industry, locking in decades
78
of dependence on gasoline.
With a vehicle electrification mandate in place, automakers would be able to
make multi-billion-dollar investments in the design of new electric vehicles with
the confidence that the entire vehicle market would become electric. Commercial
landlords could make the substantial investments necessary to make charging available at apartment buildings, businesses, and shopping centers, knowing that all new
vehicle owners would be potential customers. Utility companies could invest in
upgrading the grid, knowing that enormous new demand from electric vehicles
would be coming.

2. Climate & Public Health Rationale
There is also a need to mandate vehicle electrification for climate and public
health reasons. The carbon budget available to maintain global warming under 1.5
79
degrees Celsius is rapidly shrinking. Every gallon of gasoline burned uses up
80
twenty pounds of that budget. Given the limited carbon budget, new vehicles
that necessarily use gasoline should be proscribed. This is especially true when a
cleaner, cheaper, better-performing, and more reliable alternative is available.
As for public health, it is reasonable to restrict vehicles that burn gasoline,
which is known to release toxic pollutants including carbon monoxide, smog-

78. See, e.g., David LaGrand, Opinion, Infrastructure Needed to Spread Electric Cars, DETROIT
NEWS (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2019/09/04/opinion-infrastructureneeded-spread-electric-cars/2196681001/; Michael Roeth, The Chicken and the Egg of Electric Vehicle
Charging, FLEETOWNER (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.fleetowner.com/ideaxchange/chicken-and-eggelectric-vehicle-charging.
79. See That’s How Fast the Carbon Clock is Ticking, MCC, https://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/
research/co2-budget.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2020); Christiana Figueres et al., Emissions Are Still Rising: Ramp Up the Cuts, 564 NATURE 27 (2018); Zeke Hausfather, Analysis: How Much Carbon Budget Is
Left to Limit Global Warming to 1.5C? CARBON BRIEF (2018), https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-howmuch-carbon-budget-is-left-to-limit-global-warming-to-1-5c. A “carbon budget” is an upper limit of
CO2 emissions in order to remain below a specific global temperature target. Id.
80. How Can a Gallon of Gasoline Produce 20 Pounds of Carbon Dioxide?, FUELECONOMY.GOV,
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/contentIncludes/co2_inc.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
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casuing volatile organic compounds and nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxides, formalde81
hyde and benzene into the air. Smoking in public is restricted because of the
82
health influences on third parties, and use of hazardous chemicals is restricted
83
where safer alternatives are available.

3. Budgetary Rationale
Vehicle electrification mandates require almost no government expenditures,
unlike other electric vehicle incentive policies such as tax credits, subsidies, and
government-funded infrastructure programs, which can be difficult to implement
in the face of tight government budgets, public resistance to new taxes, and equity
84
concerns.
Opponents may contend that a vehicle electrification mandate would increase
costs to consumers by limiting consumer choice and requiring purchase of particu85
86
lar kinds of vehicles. But electric vehicle selection is growing rapidly. Electric
vehicles are already attaining cost parity on a lifetime basis, and economies of scale
and network effects mean that such costs will drop further upon a vehicle electrifi87
cation mandate going into effect. To the extent that there are costs associated
with the mandate, they would likely be borne primarily by the auto industry, which
88
has historically maintained profitability while advancing automobile technology.

81.
See Pollutants and Health, ALTERNATIVE FUELS DATA CENTER, https://afdc.energy.gov/
vehicles/emissions_pollutants.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2020).
82. Smokefree Policies Improve Health, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/
tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/protection/improve_health/index.htm (last updated Jan. 17, 2018).
83. For instance, although chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are excellent refrigerants, they have
been subject to phaseout legislation in the US and internationally. See generally Chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), EARTH SYS. RES. LAB., https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/hats/publictn/elkins/cfcs.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2019). And CFCs were themselves a safer substitute for previous refrigerants. Id.
84. See, e.g., Bradley Berman, Washington Times Equates EV Credits With Tax Cuts for the Rich,
Ignoring Oil Subsidies, ELECTREK (Dec. 9, 2019), https://electrek.co/2019/12/09/washington-timesequates-ev-credits-with-tax-cuts-for-the-rich-ignoring-oil-subsidies/.
85.
2019).

See, e.g., FREEDOM TO DRIVE COALITION, http://freedomtodrive.org/ (last visited Oct. 13,

86.

See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 57, at 4-5.

87.

See Lutsey & Nicholas, supra note 37, at 6.

88. Seven Global Car Makers KPI’s Part 3: Profitability, MOTOR MONITOR, https://lgaconsultants.com/seven-global-car-makers-kpis-part-3-profitability/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
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4. Grid Services Rationale
EV batteries can serve as an important power balancing and storage resource
89
for the electrical grid. With controlled charging, EVs can charge at times when
90
renewable power typically surges on the grid, avoiding curtailment or waste.
Technology advances are enabling EVs to supply power to the grid when
91
power demand is high, or when power outages occur, such that mass vehicle elec92
93
trification can provide flexible load balancing and resilience to the grid.

5. Competitive Rationale
The U.S. auto industry’s two major crises both occurred after eras in which it
failed to develop optimally fuel-efficient vehicles. In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S.
auto industry suffered as fuel-efficient Japanese imports gained substantial market
94
share. Then, in the mid-2000s, the industry faced bankruptcy as its SUV-heavy,
fuel-inefficient offerings were a poor match for rising gas prices and the 2008 re95
cession.
China, India, and Europe, which combined constitute the majority of the
world’s automotive market, are signaling phaseouts and other aggressive policies to
96
hasten the transition to EVs. If the U.S. auto industry resists this trend, it risks
falling behind the rest of the world in electric vehicle technology and sales. By assuring a strong domestic market for EV sales, a vehicle electrification policy will
provide major U.S. automakers with a large and guaranteed domestic market for
their EVs and enable them to even the playing field with their principal competitors.

89.

GREENBLATT ET AL., supra note 45, at 5.

90. See Julia K. Szinai et al., Reduced Grid Operating Costs and Renewable Energy Curtailment with
Electric Vehicle Charge Management, 136 ENERGY POL’Y 2020, at 1.
91.

ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 46.

92.

See Szinai et al., supra note 91; see also STEPHANIE MORSE & KAREN GLITMAN, ELECTRIC
VEHICLES AS GRID RESOURCES IN ISO-NE AND VERMONT (May 2014), https://www.veic.org/
documents/default-source/resources/reports/evt-rd-electric-vehicles-grid-resource-final-report.pdf.
93. See Elsa Wenzel, Vehicle-to-Grid Technology is Revving Up, GREEN BIZ (Nov. 2019),
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/vehicle-grid-technology-revving.
94. Mary H. Cooper, Have U.S. Automakers Turned the Corner on Quality?, CQ RESEARCHER
(1992), https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1992101600.
95. Gas Prices Put Detroit Big Three in Crisis Mode, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24896359/ns/business-autos/t/gas-prices-put-detroit-big-three-crisismode/.
96.

See Gasoline Vehicle Phaseout Advances Around the World, supra note 70.
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D. Vehicle Electrification in the United States
1. Federal Vehicle Electrification Policy
A unified federal standard for electrifying vehicles would maximize benefits
for the environment, U.S. consumers, and automakers, because it would apply to
all cars sold in the U.S. A federal standard would avoid the difficulties of passing
97
vehicle electrification mandates in all fifty states.
Such federal legislation has been proposed. The Federal “Zero Emission Vehicles Act of 2019,” introduced in May 2019 in both the House (H.R. 2764) and the
Senate (S.1487), would require auto manufacturers to sell a minimum of 50% zero
98
emission vehicles by 2030, and 100% zero emission vehicles by 2040. Under this
proposal, the majority of used cars would be zero emission vehicles by 2050. Senators and 2020 Democratic presidential candidates Harris, Gillibrand, Warren and
99
Sanders have endorsed S. 1487. Representative Gabbard sponsored H.R. 3671,
100
which would phase out sales of gasoline-powered cars in 2035.
As part of their presidential campaigns, Washington Governor Jay Inslee,
Senators Sanders, Warren, and Booker, and Andrew Yang supported a federal gasoline vehicle phaseout by 2030; presidential candidates Pete Buttigieg and Michael
101
Bloomberg supported a 2035 deadline.

2. State Vehicle Electrification Legislation
Given the Trump Administration’s opposition to measures to improve the environment, state-level approaches are probably the most realistic pathway to nearterm enactment of vehicle electrification legislation. This section describes recent
state efforts to legislate vehicle electrification.
In 2018, California Assembly member Phil Ting introduced A.B. 1745, the
first state-level gasoline phaseout bill in the U.S., aiming for a 2040 end date for

97. In fact, some states are passing measures designed to slow electric vehicle uptake. See, e.g.,
Hiroko Tabuchi, Behind the Quiet State-by-State Fight over Electric Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/business/energy-environment/electric-cars-hybrid-taxcredits.html. Georgia, for instance, repealed its $5,000 electric-vehicle tax credit in 2015 and replaced it
with a $200 registration fee for electric vehicles. Id.
98.

Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, H.R. 2764, 116th Cong. (2019).

99.

See Zero-Emission Vehicles Act of 2019, S. 1487, 116th Cong. (2019).

100.
101.

Off Fossil Fuels for a Better Future Act, H.R. 3671, 115th Cong. (2017).

See Bradley Berman, 2020 Democratic Candidates: Where Each Stands on Electric Cars,
ELECTREK (Dec. 21, 2019), https://electrek.co/2019/12/21/2020-democratic-candidates-where-eachstands-on-electric-cars/; Michael Bloomberg Outlines Plans for Cleaner Buildings, Cars, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 17,
2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2020-01-17/michael-bloomberg-outlines-plansfor-cleaner-buildings-cars; Benjy Sarlin, Green New Ride: 2020ers Race Toward an Electric Car Future, But
Trump Has Other Ideas, NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/
green-new-ride-2020ers-race-toward-electric-car-future-trump-n1055081.
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102

sales of new gasoline vehicles. The oil industry lobbied strongly against A.B.
103
1745, and the bill did not pass out of the Assembly Transportation Commit104
tee. However, in 2019, California moved forward with a $1.5 million study,
105
which analyzes, among other things, pathways to a carbon-neutral vehicle fleet.
California is in a unique position to influence emission standards through a
special waiver provision in the Clean Air Act (CAA). The CAA authorizes Cali106
fornia to apply for a waiver of the preemption provision of the CAA. With an
107
approved federal waiver, California could pass a gasoline vehicle phaseout. If
California required 100% of new vehicles to be zero emissions as part of its Zero
Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) program, such regulations would apply to the ten other
states that have adopted that program—about one-third of the U.S. vehicle mar108
ket.
California’s authority under the CAA to set its own emissions standards (and
the ability of other states to follow California’s rules) is under attack by the Trump
administration. The administration has issued an order revoking California’s special status under the CAA and invalidating California’s previously approved emissions regulations, despite the lack of precedent or legal basis for such an order.
109
That order is now the subject of a court challenge joined by twenty-three states.

102.

A.B. 1745, State Assemb., 2017-2018 Reg. Session. (Cal. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/

faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1745.
103. E.g., Katie Fehrenbacher, What’s Behind the California Bill to Ban Internal Combustion Car
Sales by 2040, GREENBIZ (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/whats-behind-californiabill-ban-internal-combustion-car-sales-2040.
104.

Bill History, AB-1745 Vehicles: Clean Cars 2040 Act, Cal. Legis. Info., https://leginfo.legislature.

ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1745 (last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
105. See Dustin Gardiner, California Idea to Study Phasing Out Gas-Powered Cars Wins New Life,
S.F. CHRON. (June 15, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/California-idea-to-studyphasing-out-gas-powered-13999366.php.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (2018). The Federal Clean Air Act allows California to seek a
waiver of the preemption provisions of the act that ordinarily forbid conflicting state legislation. See
generally, Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-andauthorizations (last updated June 23, 2017).
107. Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-andauthorizations (last updated June 23, 2017).
108. See, e.g., Bengt Halvorson, Colorado Adopts California Electric Vehicle Mandate, GREEN CAR
REPORTS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1124616_colorado-adopts-californiaelectric-vehicle-mandate.
109. E.g., Scott Neuman, Trump Says California’s Ability to Set Its Own Emissions Standards Will be
Revoked, NPR (Sept. 18, 2019) https://www.npr.org/2019/09/18/761815991/white-house-to-revokewaiver-allowing-california-to-set-its-own-emissions-standa; Jonathan H. Adler, Will EPA Trump California’s Clean Air Act Waiver?, REASON (Aug. 10, 2018), https://reason.com/2018/08/10/will-epa-trumpcalifornias-clean-air-act/. It has long been assumed that California’s Clean Air Act waiver included a de
facto waiver of the preemption provisions of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act as well. See
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110

Gasoline car phaseout legislation was also introduced in Hawaii in 2019.
The legislation would have prohibited the sale of any new car in 2030 or later that
111
used an internal combustion engine. Had the bill advanced, it may have run into
preemption difficulties. The bill’s legislative findings that the “internal combustion
engine contributes to climate change [and] exacerbates air pollution” signal that the
bill is designed to regulate greenhouse gases and air pollution, which are within the
112
ambit of the Clean Air Act. The bill also states that its purpose “is to eliminate
Hawaii’s dependence on fossil fuels,” which could constitute a regulatory purpose
113
within the scope of the EPCA.
Also in 2019, the Massachusetts legislature introduced a bill that would have required all new vehicles registered in the state be
114
zero emissions vehicles starting in 2038. The zero emissions requirement would
115
likely have subjected this bill to preemption under the Clean Air Act.
Related—albeit less expansive—legislation has been introduced or enacted in
116
other states. New Hampshire considered converting the state’s government117
owned vehicles to ZEVs, although the measure was vetoed by the governor. New
Jersey passed a bill setting a goal of 85% of new-vehicle sales being electric by
118
2040. The District of Columbia passed an act requiring that public buses and

Green Mountain v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 354 (D. Vt. 2007); Central Valley Chrysler Jeep v.
Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2007). The Trump Administration now asserts that
California’s CAA waiver does not grant a concurrent waiver under the EPCA. See also EPCA
PREEMPTION FACT SHEET, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 2018),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/fact_sheet_-_epca_preemption_final_
clean_080218_v1-tag.pdf.
110. S.B. 1338, 13th Leg., Reg. Session (Haw. 2019), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
session2019/bills/SB1338_.htm.
111. Id. (“Beginning December 31, 2029, no person shall sell or offer for sale any motor vehicle
that utilizes an internal combustion engine and has fewer than three hundred miles registered on the
odometer.”).
112.

Id.; see infra Section II.B.1.

113. S.B. 1338, 13th Leg., Reg. Session (Haw. 2019), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
session2019/bills/SB1338_.htm; see infra Section II.B.2.
114.
An Act to a Clean Legislation Future, H. 2869, 191st Leg., Reg. Session (Mass. 2019),
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/191/H2869/BillHistory.
115.
Id. (“On and after January 1, 2038, the registrar shall not accept an application for original
registration for any motor vehicle unless that vehicle is a zero emissions vehicle.”).
116. See Gasoline Vehicle Phaseout Advances Around the World, COLTURA, https://www.coltura.org/
world-gasoline-phaseouts (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
117. See Press Release, Christopher T. Sununu, State of N.H. Office of the Governor, Governor’s Veto Message Regarding Senate Bill 275 (June 25, 2019), https://www.governor.nh.gov/newsmedia/press-2019/documents/sb275-veto-message.pdf.
118.

S. 2252, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
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119

privately owned fleet vehicles be ZEVs by 2045. And a number of cities are con120
sidering restriction of gasoline-vehicle use within their boundaries.
There are advantages to a state-based route. Individual states can experiment
with approaches to curbing gasoline use, with successful approaches ultimately being adopted by other states. Under this strategy, states act as “laboratories of de121
mocracy,” under the traditional principles of federalism, doing at the state level
122
what might be difficult or impossible to do at once nation-wide. Unlike countries, though, U.S. states must contend with and overcome the preemptive effects
of federal law.

3. Washington’s Vehicle Electrification Legislation
This Article considers the preemption of state vehicle electrification mandate
123
using the proposed Washington legislation as a model.
The proposed legislation requires that all cars of model year 2030 or later sold
124
or registered in Washington State be electric vehicles. This requirement is re125
ferred to as the “2030 requirement.” The bill defines “electric vehicles” to mean

119.

See Gasoline Vehicle Phaseout Advances Around the World, supra note 68.

120.

See THE MAYOR’S ELEC. VEHICLE WORKING GRP., PROPOSED ELECTRIC VEHICLE
ROADMAP FOR SAN FRANCISCO (June 2019), https://sfenvironment.org/sites/default/files/fliers/files/
sfe_tr_ev-roadmap.pdf (setting goals and planning towards restricting gasoline-vehicle use within their
boundaries); see also MAYOR ERIC GARCETTI, L.A.’S GREEN NEW DEAL: SUSTAINABLE CITY PLAN
82 (2019), https://plan.lamayor.org/sites/default/files/pLAn_2019_final.pdf (planning for 80% of the
vehicles driven within the city to be zero emissions by 2035, rising to 100% by 2050, and planning to
roll out fossil fuel free zones in the city beginning in 2030); Seattle, Other Major World Cities Pledge to
Ban Gas, Diesel Vehicles, KOMO (Oct. 23, 2017), https://komonews.com/news/local/seattle-other-majorworld-cities-pledge-to-ban-gas-diesel-vehicles; CITY OF BERKELEY, COMMUNITY ENVTL. ADVISORY
COMM., PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF CITY STREETS FOR OPERATING, PARKING, OR IDLING
COMBUSTION VEHICLES BY 2045, https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Planning_and_
Development/Level_3_-_Commissions/Commission_for_Community_Environmental_Advisory/
CEAC%20DRAFT%20Combustion%20Vehicle%20Operation%20Ban%20082619.pdf.
121. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1261 n.6 (2009) (collecting sources); Adam Babich, The Supremacy Clause, Cooperative Federalism,
and the Full Federal Regulatory Purpose, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 26-29 (2012) (describing environmental
cooperative federalism in the United States).
122. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2022 (2014) (“States also
do sometimes still act as first-movers, performing their traditional ‘states as laboratories’ role, in trying
out controversial policies. Sometimes, such state innovation even creates what might be understood as a
different kind of ‘national law’ . . . an informal fifty-state convergence that makes federal legislation
unnecessary.”). Every state had taken some measure to combat climate change by 2006. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 880-81 (2008).
123.

Draft bill concerning the electrification of transportation, supra note 18.

124.

Id.

125.

Id.
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vehicles using an electric motor rather than an internal combustion engine for propulsion.
The Washington vehicle electrification bill begins with legislative findings related to the sufficiency of existing electric vehicle technology and the state’s own
126
electrical-grid resources.
It articulates an economic-development and job127
creation rationale based on technological development. It finds that electric vehicles can serve as a power load balancing and energy storage and resilience re128
source for the electric grid. It finds that widespread vehicle electrification will
save consumers money on vehicle maintenance, and will drive down electric rates
129
for all utility consumers. It also addresses environmental concerns not regulated
by the CAA or EPCA, such as the the dripping of toxic liquids and stormwater
130
pollution. The bill finds that encouraging adoption of electric vehicles will in131
crease the utility of all electric vehicles through an economic network effect. All
these rationales are outside the scope of federal preemption.
132
Operationally, the bill directs the state’s transportation commission to implement a “scoping plan” for implementing the 2030 requirement. Criteria for de133
veloping and analyzing the plan are prescribed. The commission is directed to
134
promulgate regulations by 2025 for implementing the 2030 requirement.
The bill follows in the wake of “100% Clean” legislation enacted in the spring
of 2019, which requires Washington utilities to transition to a carbon-neutral electricity supply by 2030 and puts the state on a path to entirely eliminate fossil fuels
135
from electricity generation by 2045, and a similar vehicle electrification mandate
136
bill introduced in 2020.

126.

Id.

127.

Id.

128.

Id.

129.

Id.

130.

Id.

131.

Id.

132.

See generally WASH. STATE TRANSP. COMM’N, https://wstc.wa.gov/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).

133.

Draft bill concerning the electrification of transportation, supra note 18.

134.

Id.

135. S.B. 5116, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2019 Wash. Sess. Laws 1608, 1, lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/
biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5116.pdf; JAY INSLEE, POLICY BRIEF: WASHINGTON
ENACTS STRONGEST CLEAN ELECTRICITY STANDARD IN THE NATION 1 (May 2019),
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/clean-electricity-policy-brief-billsigning.pdf; see also David Roberts, A Closer Look at Washington’s Superb New 100% Clean Electricity Bill,
VOX (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/4/18/18363292/washingtonclean-energy-bill.
136.

H.B. 2515, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020).
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II. PREEMPTION PRECEDENTS FOR STATE REGULATION OF VEHICLES
Circuit court and Supreme Court precedent does not require preemption of
vehicle electrification mandates. Section II.A of this Part establishes the constitutional basis for preemption. Then, Section II.B reviews the federal statutes that
would ground preemption challenges to state vehicle electrification—namely, the
Clean Air Act and the Environmental Policy & Conservation Act. Finally, Section
II.C discusses the major circuit court case law on the preemption provisions relevant to the proposed Washington vehicle electrification legislation.

A. Constitutional Basis of Preemption
137

Federal preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause. A law otherwise
within a state’s power to enact is invalid if federal law provides otherwise. Federal
law may preempt state and local law either by express terms in statutory language
(i.e., express preemption) or by implication based on a statute’s purpose and struc138
ture (i.e., implied preemption). Implied preemption appears in two broad varie139
ties. First is field preemption, in which a federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room” for state
140
law. Second is conflict preemption, in which “compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility” or in which a state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
141
Congress.”
The basic principle of preemption—in the event of a conflict, federal law prevails—is straightforward. But the underlying analysis can be trickier, especially
when state laws seek to regulate matters not contemplated by the drafters of prior
federal legislation. Because preemption involves analysis of the overlap of unique
state laws with diverse federal laws, the application of preemption doctrine is context dependent and difficult to predict.
Deciding when a law is preempted is context-driven, and there is no one clear
142
rule. Justice Frankfurter noted that “the generalities” regarding preemption that
may be drawn from the cases do not decide them. Rather, he wrote, “the fate of
state legislation in these cases has not been determined by these generalities but by

137. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108
(1992) (articulating that preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause); Virginia Uranium v. Warren,
139 S. Ct. 1894, 1901 (June 17, 2019) (echoing same); see also Tufariello v. Long Island R. Co., 458 F.3d
80, 86 (2d Cir. 2006).
138.

See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 545 (1992).

139.

Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1901.

140.

Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.

141.

Id.

142. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“In the final analysis, there can be no one
crystal clear distinctly marked formula.”).
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the weight of the circumstances and the practical and experienced judgment in ap143
plying these generalities to the particular instances.”
144
Ultimately, the intent of Congress is the touchstone of preemption analysis.
145
This is true whether the preemption in question is implied or express. In the ar146
147
ea of preemption analysis, textualism has had less sway. However, as discussed
below, recent decisions such as Virginia Uranium point to an increasing role for tex148
tualism in preemption analysis.
Moreover, there remains a presumption against preemption, a position ad149
vanced by the Court’s increasingly influential conservatives. Congress must be
150
“clear” or supply a “plain statement” to preempt, and courts must assume “that
the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal
151
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” But Congress is
152
often silent about its intent, at least as far as preemption is concerned.
Preemption has significant policy ramifications. Judicial determinations of the
validity of state and local law tip the balance of power between state and federal
governments and can limit the ability of state legislatures and state courts to com-

143.

Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 211 (1944).

144.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001).

145. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 96; see also Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1901
(2019) (“We examine . . . preemptive effect much as we would any other about statutory meaning, looking to the text and context of the law in question and guided by the traditional tools of statutory interpretation.”) (plurality opinion); id. (noting that the categories of “express, field, and conflict preemption . . . are not rigidly distinct”) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372
n.6 (2000)); Catherine L. Fisk, 33 HARV. J. LEGIS. 35, 43-46 (1996) (characterizing the difference between the express and implied preemption analyses as a “distinction without a difference”).
146. Textualism is a focus on the text of a statute and a sharp deemphasis—or even delegitimization—of other traditional statutory interpretation approaches such as purposivism or intentionalism. See
generally ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy Gutmann,
ed., 1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW (2012).
147.

See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2013).

148. See Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1907-08 (plurality opinion) (“Efforts to ascribe unenacted purposes and objectives to a federal statute face many of the same challenges as inquiries into state
legislative intent . . . . The only thing a court can be sure of is what can be found in the law itself.”).
149. See Meltzer, supra note 147, at 35-43, 52-55. See also Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 808
(2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[F]ederal law pre-empts state law only if the two are in logical contradiction.”) (internal citations omitted). “The doctrine of ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption impermissibly rests on judicial guesswork about broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not contained within the text of federal law.’” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
150. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 457-61 (1991).
151. Ass’n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas, 720 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008)) (alteration in original).
152.

Fisk, supra note 145, at 43-44.
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153

bat problems facing their citizens. As independent sovereigns, states can blaze
trails and pass innovative or nationally controversial legislation. Eventually, as
more states adopt the legislation, they can converge around an optimal solution
154
that bypasses the need for federal legislation. Thus, although an overly narrow
approach to preemption would shorten the reach of federal law and its uniform application across the fifty states, an overly expansive approach to preemption would
limit this ability of states to serve as “laboratories of democracy,” and to enact in155
novative local policies under the traditional principles of federalism.

B. Federal Statutory Authority Relevant to Vehicle Electrification Mandates
Two statutes are relevant to preemption of state vehicle electrification mandates: the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Environmental Policy & Conservation
Act (EPCA).

1. The Clean Air Act
The CAA is one of the most significant modern environmental laws. First
passed in 1963, the Act regulates emissions from various sources with the goal of
156
protecting public health. It has been subsequently updated by various amend-

153. See, e.g., Michael R. Abrams, Note, Renovations Needed: The FDA’s Floor/Ceiling Framework,
Preemption, and the Opioid Epidemic, 117 MICH. L. REV. 143, 153-60 (2018) (discussing how preemption
affects tort law in the context of the opioid epidemic and federal prescription drug regulation).
154. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2021 (2014) (“States also
do sometimes still act as first-movers, performing their traditional ‘states as laboratories’ role, in trying
out controversial policies. Sometimes, such state innovation even creates what might be understood as a
different kind of ‘national law’ . . . an informal fifty-state convergence that makes federal legislation
unnecessary.”).
155. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1261 n.6 (2009) (collecting sources); cf. Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1906
(2019) (plurality opinion) (“Consider just some of the costs to cooperative federalism and individual
liberty we would invite by inquiring into state legislative purpose too precipitately. The natural tendency of regular federal judicial inquiries into state legislative intentions would be to stifle deliberation in
state legislatures and encourage resort to secrecy and subterfuge. That would inhibit the sort of open
and vigorous legislative debate that our Constitution recognizes as vital to testing ideas and improving
laws.”).
156. Christopher D. Ahlers, Origins of the Clean Air Act: A New Interpretation, 45 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 75, 84-94 (2015).
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157

ments. Notably, Part A of Title II of the CAA covers regulation of motor vehicle
158
emissions and fuel standards.
Although the CAA is an expansive federal regulatory regime, the congressional findings and declaration of purpose set forth in the CAA suggest that Congress
159
contemplated a far-reaching role for states in protecting air quality. Section
101(a)(3) finds “that air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its
160
source is the primary responsibility of states and local governments.” Section
101(b) declares the CAA’s purpose is “to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the pro161
ductive capacity of its population.” Section 101(c) declares that “[a] primary goal
of this chapter [of the CAA] is to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions, consistent with the provisions of this
162
chapter, for pollution prevention.”
The above-mentioned provisions of the CAA clearly contemplate state involvement in air pollution regulation, and the law was originally passed without
163
any express preemption provision.
Nonetheless, the Air Quality Act of 1967 amended the CAA to include such a
provision as a compromise between states (who favored autonomy) and manufac164
turers (who favored preemption). The result, Section 209(a) of the CAA, provides that “[n]o State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles
165
or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.” It is this “relating to” provi-

157. See Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 87-272, 79 Stat. 992; Air
Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485; Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91604; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2010) (Part A of Title II deals with Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel
Standards).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2010) (finding “that air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution
control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments;” finding “that Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for development of cooperative Federal, State, regional,
and local programs to prevent and control air pollution;” declaring a primary goal to “encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions . . . .”).
160.

Id.

161.

Id. § 7401(b)(1).

162.

Id. § 7401(c).

163. Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Cars, Carbon, and Climate Change, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 665, 676 (2008).
164.

Id.

165.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2018).
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sion that establishes the express preemptive effect of the CAA as far as vehicle
166
emissions are concerned.
This preemption is limited. The CAA’s express preemption provision is followed by a savings clause: “Nothing in this part shall preclude or deny to any State
or political subdivision thereof the right otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict
167
the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.”
A New Jersey District Court found that
[w]hile the Court recognizes the breadth of federal regulation in the
[emissions] area, the savings clause [in CAA § 209(d)] suggests that Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of motor vehicle regulation. Instead, the text of the Act explicitly contemplates continued state
168
involvement in the regulation of motor vehicles.
The court emphasized that “federal regulation of motor vehicle emissions does not
extend so far as to preclude claims that do not relate to adoption or enforcement of
169
emissions standards.”

2. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
170

The EPCA was passed in the midst of the 1970s oil crisis to secure U.S. en171
ergy independence. That statute authorized the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration to create fuel-efficiency standards, and preempted states from do172
ing the same.
A purpose of EPCA, set forth in Section 2(4) of the Act, is “to conserve energy supplies through energy conservation programs, and, where necessary, the regu173
lation of certain energy uses.” Another purpose, set forth in Section 2(5) of the
174
Act, is “to provide for improved energy efficiency of motor vehicles.”
EPCA’s preemption provision provides, in pertinent part, that

166. See Ludwiszewski & Haake, supra note 163, at 676; see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South
Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 258 (2004) (stating that “it appears likely that certain
aspects of the [respondent government rules] are pre-empted” by Section 209(a)).
167.

Clean Air Act of 1963 § 209(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d).

168. In re Caterpillar, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-3722 (JBS-JS), slip op. at 41-42 (D.N.J. July 29, 2015)
(footnotes omitted).
169.

Id. at 42.

170.

Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975).

171.

See id. § 2, 89 Stat. 874.

172. See EELPS Staff, California, CAFE Standards, and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
HLS ENVTL. & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (June 19, 2018), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/
california-cafe-standards-and-the-energy-policy-and-conservation-act/.
173.

42 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4) (2018).

174.

Id. § 6201(a)(5).
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[w]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is
in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel
economy standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy
175
standard under this chapter.
Parallel to the CAA, it is this provision of EPCA that grounds its preemptive effect with respect to vehicle fuel economy standards.
“Fuel” is defined by EPCA as “gasoline . . . diesel oil . . . or other liquid or
176
gaseous fuel.” “Fuel economy” is defined as “the average number of miles traveled by an automobile for each gallon of gasoline (or equivalent amount of other
177
178
fuel) used.” EPCA defines “alternative fuels” to include electricity and directs
the EPA administrator to “include in the calculation of average fuel economy . . .
equivalent petroleum-based fuel economy values determined by the Secretary of
179
Energy for various classes of electric vehicles.” The EPA calculates fuel econo180
my for electric vehicles in terms of miles per gallon equivalent, or MPGe.

C. Leading Vehicle Emissions and
Fuel Economy Standards Preemption Precedents
A limited number of decisions bear directly on the preemptive effect of the
CAA and EPCA with respect to emissions-related laws. Of these, three are particularly pertinent: the Supreme Court’s decision in EMA v. South Coast Air Quality
181
Management District, the Second Circuit decision in Metropolitan Taxicab v. City
182
of New York, and the Fifth Circuit decision in Association of Taxicab Operators
183
USA v. City of Dallas.

1. EMA v. South Coast Air Quality Management District
In EMA, the Supreme Court struck down California South Coast Air Quality
Management District rules (“fleet rules”) prohibiting fleet operators from purchas184
ing new diesel vehicles based on section 209(a) of the CAA. The stated purpose

175.

49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018).

176.

Id. § 32901(a)(10).

177.

Id. § 32901(a)(11).

178.

Id. § 32901(a)(1)(J).

179.

Id. § 32904(a)(2)(B).

180.

See Text Version of the Electric Vehicle Label, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/

fueleconomy/text-version-electric-vehicle-label (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
181.

541 U.S. 246 (2004).

182.

615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010).

183.

720 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2013).

184.

Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (“EMA”), 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
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of the fleet rules in question was to reduce pollutant emissions from fleet vehi185
cles. The defendant air district had argued, and the Ninth Circuit had agreed,
that the fleet rules escaped preemption because they were indirect “purchase re186
strictions” rather than direct vehicle emissions “standards.” The Supreme Court
reversed on an 8-1 vote, ruling that the fleet rules’ commands to fleet operators to
not purchase diesel vehicles functioned as emission controls on the manufacture
and sale of new motor vehicles and engines, and were therefore a prohibited
187
“standard relating to the control of emissions” in conflict with the CAA. The
Court’s holding focused on whether purchase restrictions constituted a prohibited
188
standard.
The EMA Court stated that
[t]he criteria referred to in [CAA] § 209(a) relate to the emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine. To meet them the vehicle or engine must
not emit more than a certain amount of a given pollutant, must be
equipped with a certain type of pollution-control device, or must have
189
some other design feature related to the control of emissions.
Unlike the fleet rules in EMA, the proposed Washington legislation does not have
a stated purpose of regulating emissions; it does not set emissions limits, mandate
the use of a pollution-control device, nor require the use of a design feature related
190
to the control of emissions. It does not reference nor directly regulate emissions,
191
gasoline, or diesel. Rather, the Washington bill is grounded in the economic and
other non-emissions benefits of an all-electric vehicle fleet—rationales not covered
192
by the CAA. The stated non-emissions benefits to Washington include job creation, economic development, consumer benefit, water quality and salmon protec193
tion—all domains squarely within traditional conceptions of state police power.

185. See, e.g., Cal. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Commercial Airport Ground Access (Fleet
Rules), Rule 1194(a) (2000), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/drdb/sc/curhtml/r1194.pdf (“For all public and
private fleets that provide passenger transportation services out of commercial airports operating in the
South Coast Air Quality Management (District), this rule requires . . . vehicle fleet operators to acquire
cleaner burning or alternative-fueled vehicles to reduce air toxic and criteria pollutant emissions when
procuring or leasing these vehicles in the District unless otherwise exempt.”).
186.

EMA, 541 U.S. at 251-52.

187.

Id. at 252-55.

188.

See id.

189. EMA, 541 U.S. at 253. Compliance with California’s then-extant ZEV regulation was one of
several pathways by which a fleet operator under the fleet rules could meet the emission-control requirements. The ZEV regulation in question (CCR 1960.1) did mention electricity but defined a ZEV
as a vehicle that does not “produce emissions of any criteria pollutants.”
190.

See supra Section I.D.3.

191.

Id.

192.

Id.

193.

Id.
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Challengers of the Washington legislation would likely argue that an electric
194
motor mandate is a “design feature related to the control of emissions,” as prohibited by the CAA. But that argument is overly simplistic. An electric motor is
not simply a lower-emission or more efficient internal combustion engine: it is an
entirely different propulsion mechanism. And the primary purpose of an electric
motor is propelling the vehicle forward, not controlling emissions. It is unlike a
diesel engine (which still generates emissions, but a different amount) or a catalytic
converter (a design feature whose sole purpose is emissions reduction).
The reach of EMA is also in doubt fifteen years later. Because the Washington
legislation does not explicitly state an emissions-related purpose, the Court would
have to conjure such a purpose out of context and legislative history and find that
inferred purpose to be sufficient to ground preemption. But, as discussed later, the
increasingly textualist and conservative court is likely to be reluctant to do so, es195
pecially after Virginia Uranium v. Warren.

2. Metropolitan Taxicab v. City of New York
196

In Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York, the Second Circuit held that New York City rules requiring taxicab owners to charge lower lease
rates for conventionally powered taxis relative to hybrid taxis were preempted by
the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), which governs fuel
197
economy standards. It based its decision on a finding that the purpose of the
198
rules requiring hybrids was to regulate fuel economy. In light of the purpose to
regulate fuel economy, the court held the rules were in direct conflict with
199
EPCA. The court ruled that the city’s stated justification that the measure targeted fuel cost risk to taxi drivers was inadequate, because the rules directly related
to the fuel economy of the vehicles affected, and the cost savings to drivers were
200
derivative of the fuel economy benefits.
The proposed Washington bill can be distinguished from the ordinance the
Second Circuit held preempted in Metropolitan Taxicab. First, the Washington bill
does not contain a reference to fuel economy standards or make fuel economy

194.

EMA, 541 U.S. at 253.

195. Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019). See infra Section III.A for a fuller
discussion of the impacts of Virginia Uranium.
196.

Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 2010).

197.

See supra Section II.B.2.

198. Metropolitan Taxicab, 615 F.3d at 157 (“[T]he City is unable to identify any plausible alternative reason [other than fuel economy] for the imposition of such an engine-based rule.”).
199. Section 509(a) of the EPCA provides “[w]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed
by this chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or
regulation related to fuel economy standards, or average fuel economy standards for, automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.” 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018).
200.

Metropolitan Taxicab, 615 F.3d at 157.
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standards essential to its operation, which was the basis for the ruling in Metropolitan Taxicab. Second, the Washington bill has powerful non-emissions, non-fuel
economy justifications, unlike Metropolitan Taxicab, where the court based its holding on the premise that there are no advantages to hybrids other than their better
201
fuel economy. Finally, the stated benefits of the Washington legislation, such as
improved reliability of the electric grid, less contaminated water runoff and the
202
like, are not derivative of fuel economy benefits, as mandated reduction of fuel
203
cost risk was found to be in Metropolitan Taxicab —they are independently valua204
ble.

3. Association of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas
205

In Association of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas (ATO), a decision at
odds with Metropolitan Taxicab, the Fifth Circuit upheld an ordinance incentivizing
compressed natural gas (CNG) taxicabs by giving them the right to go to the head
of the taxicab line at the airport.
The court found that such modest incentive programs do not constitute pro206
hibited “standards” under the CAA. The taxicab privileges were neither “standards” on their face nor because of their indirect effects. The court concluded that
the program, “enacted using traditional police powers, [was] not superseded by any
clear and manifest purpose of Congress, above all where Congress’s term ‘standard’
207
has been identified as one ‘susceptible’ to a mandate/incentive distinction.”
Although the Fifth Circuit upheld the ordinance in ATO, the Washington bill
can be distinguished from the ATO ordinance on the basis that the Dallas ordinance specifically referenced the surrounding region’s nonattainment of ozone
standards and the fewer air pollutants emitted by CNG vehicles. The references to
air quality put the Dallas ordinance squarely within the ambit of the CAA, and
therefore required a closer analysis of allowable local regulation under the CAA
than does the Washington bill, which does not have a stated purpose of reducing
emissions.
The conflicting rationales leading to opposing results in Metropolitan Taxicab
and ATO (decided three years later) illustrate the often-contradictory nature of

201.

Id. at 157-58.

202.

See supra Section I.D.3.

203.

Metropolitan Taxicab, 615 F.3d at 158.

204. A federal district court in Massachusetts found EPCA preemption on nearly identical facts
to those in Metropolitan Taxicab, and that case can be distinguished from the Washington legislation on
the same grounds. See Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88, 92 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding a
requirement for new taxicabs to meet “efficiency” standards, with those standards defined to include
only hybrid taxis, to be related to fuel economy standards).
205.

Association of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas (ATO), 720 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2013).

206.

ATO, 720 F.3d at 539-42.

207.

Id. at 540 (internal citation omitted).
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preemption analysis and show that EMA, by itself, does not signal an end to state
efforts to control vehicle emissions.

III. VEHICLE ELECTRIFICATION MANDATE PREEMPTION THROUGH
THE LENS OF VIRGINIA URANIUM
How would today’s Court approach a state-based vehicle electrification mandate? Part III.A demonstrates that in Virginia Uranium v. Warren, the Supreme
Court indicated an increasing unwillingness to inquire into state motives if the
clear text of a federal statute does not support preemption. Part III.B contends that
the proposed Washington vehicle electrification bill is not expressly preempted
under the “relating to” clauses of the CAA or EPCA. Part III.C concludes that the
vehicle electrification mandate would not be impliedly preempted.

A. The Court and Preemption Under Virginia Uranium
The Supreme Court’s most recent examination of its preemption jurispru208
dence came in June of 2019 with Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren. The decision,
which featured a 3-3-3 split of opinions, signaled growing skepticism of the
Court’s preemption jurisprudence. In particular, the case called into question the
practice of federal judges peering into state motives for passing challenged legislation.
In Virginia Uranium, the Court considered whether a Virginia law banning
209
uranium mining was preempted by the Federal Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The
Commonwealth of Virginia had banned uranium mining in the 1970s following the
210
discovery of a large deposit of uranium ore. The ban was ostensibly motivated,
211
at least in part, by concerns about the environment and public health. The law
banned uranium mining until a state-established permitting process could be de212
veloped. But interest in uranium mining waned in the 1970s and 1980s, a permit213
ting process was never established, and the ban was never lifted. This century
214
saw rising uranium prices, prompting new interest in mining. Virginia Uranium,
after unsuccessfully lobbying to lift the ban, sought a declaratory judgment that the
215
ban was preempted by the AEA.

208.

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).

209.

Id. at 1900.

210.

Id. at 1910-11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

211.

Id. at 1910.

212.

Id.

213.

Id.

214.

See id.

215.

Id.
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Understanding the preemption argument in Virginia Uranium requires basic
216
understanding of the production of nuclear fuel. First, uranium ore—that is, underground rocks embedded with impure but extractable uranium—is mined from
217
the earth. To separate the valuable uranium from the rest of the mined material,
a process called “milling” is used, in which the ore is crushed and chemically treat218
ed. The resulting extracted uranium is then processed elsewhere, while sandy,
219
radioactive waste called “tailings” remains at the mining site. Milling and tailing
substances must be carefully stored—usually close to the mining site, as Virginia
220
Uranium planned to do.
The AEA regulates milling and tailing, but not mining; that is, the AEA on its
221
face only applies once uranium is removed from the earth. Virginia Uranium,
though, contended that the expansive nature of the AEA preempted state uranium
mining laws by establishing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the lone regu222
lator of anything having to do with uranium, including mining. The NRC had
223
not banned uranium mining, the company argued, so no one else could either.
Further, the NRC had been empowered by the AEA to govern public health and
224
safety aspects of the uranium fuel production process. Virginia Uranium contended that the Commonwealth had been motivated not by resource-conservation
concerns but by health and safety concerns, thus seeking to improperly, if indirect225
ly, impinge on the NRC’s regulatory authority.
Justice Gorsuch, in a lead opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh,
226
held that Virginia’s uranium-mining ban was not preempted. The justice first
discarded an express-preemption argument, noting that the text of the statute only
imbued the NRC with regulatory authority after uranium’s removal from the
ground. Virginia Uranium had contended that language in the AEA prevented
states from regulating on the basis of nuclear safety, given that the language only
covered purposes other than safety:

216.

See id. at 1900 (plurality opinion).

217. See id.; Radioactive Waste From Uranium Mining and Milling, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/radtown/radioactive-waste-uranium-mining-and-milling (last updated Mar. 29, 2019).
218.

See Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1900.

219.

See id. at 1900.

220.

Id.

221.

Id. at 1900-02 (plurality opinion).

222.

Id. at 1901 (plurality opinion).

223. See id. at 1901 (“And because the NRC’s regulations say nothing about uranium mining . . .
[the company] remains free to mine as it will in Virginia or elsewhere.”).
224.

See id. at 1909-10 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

225.

See id. at 1912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

226. See id. at 1900 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion) (“Virginia Uranium insists that the [AEA]
preempts a state law banning uranium mining, but we do not see it.”).
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any
State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protec227
tion against radiation hazards.
The Court, though, rejected such an expansive reading. Instead, it held that the
provision constituted a “non-preemption clause” limiting which state regulatory
228
activities may be scrutinized.
Justice Gorsuch also expressed strong skepticism regarding inquiry into state
legislative purpose when conducting an implied preemption analysis:
It is one thing to . . . inquire exactingly into state legislative purposes
when state law prohibits a regulated activity like the construction of a nuclear plant, and thus comes close to trenching on core federal powers reserved to the federal government by the AEA. It is another thing to do as
Virginia Uranium wishes and impose the same exacting scrutiny on state
laws prohibiting an activity like mining far removed from the NRC’s his229
toric powers.
Rather, such scrutiny requires a “clearer congressional mandate” because of the se230
riousness of “intrusion into state sovereignty.” Justice Gorsuch pointed out that
a later decision on the preemptive effect of the AEA on state tort law declined to
inquire into state legislative purposes—despite state tort law’s purpose of regulat231
ing public safety. Later Supreme Court case law had similarly expressed willing232
ness to reconsider the appropriateness of looking into state legislative purpose.
In examining field preemption, Justice Gorsuch wrote that what matters is “what
233
the State did, not why it did it.”
The Justice also expressed concern that an expansive preemption doctrine
234
would threaten principles of federalism and individual liberty. In this view, in-

227. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (2012); Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1902-03 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion) (“The company suggests that, properly read, the provision greatly expands the preemptive
effect of the AEA and demands the displacement of any state law (touching on mining or any other
subject) if that law was enacted for the purpose of protecting the public against ‘radiation hazards.’ And,
the company adds, Virginia’s law bears just such an impermissible purpose. In our view, this reading
nearly turns the provision on its head.”).
228. Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1902-03 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion); see id. at 1912
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing with the plurality that § 2021(k) limits the scope of federal
preemption).
229.

Id. at 1904 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion).

230.

Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996) (plurality opinion)).

231. Id. at 1905 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion) (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
232. Id. at 1905 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,
84-85 n.7 (1990)).
233.

Id. at 1905-06 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases).

234.

Id. at 1906 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion).
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quiring into state legislative purpose would “stifle deliberation in state legislatures
235
and encourage resort to secrecy and subterfuge.” This would “inhibit the sort of
open and vigorous legislative debate that our Constitution recognizes as vital to
236
testing ideas and improving laws.” The Justice questioned the possibility of discerning any one particular purpose of legislation, due to the complex and compro237
mise-driven nature of the legislative process.
Similar skepticism was evident regarding conflict preemption. Virginia Uranium had argued that Virginia’s mining law stood as an obstacle to achieving Congress’s objectives, disrupting the balance Congress struck between developing nu238
clear power and mitigating its safety and environmental issues. A mining ban, it
239
contended, would “undermine” the NRC’s regulatory authority downstream.
Justice Gorsuch, however, rejected as “simplistic” the argument that such a
broad Congressional intent could be read into the AEA, noting that the preemption doctrine cannot “elevate abstract and unenacted legislative desires above state
240
law.” He added, “[e]fforts to ascribe unenacted purposes and objectives to a federal statute face many of the same challenges as inquiries into state legislative in241
tent.” Importantly, “any ‘[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose,’ whether express or
implied, must therefore be ‘sought in the text and structure of the statute at is242
sue.’”
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, concurred in the
243
judgment but articulated a more reserved view of preemption. Justice Ginsburg
declined to join Justice Gorsuch’s stark rejection of inquiry into either state or fed244
eral legislative motives, viewing it as outside the scope of the case. Rather, she
245
wrote, the case could be resolved under existing preemption precedent. In her
view, field preemption was plainly not evident because the statute, by its text, did
not regulate mining. Rather, she noted, the controlling provision of the AEA invoked federal regulation only when source material is “remov[ed] from its place of
246
deposit in nature.” Nor did conflict preemption apply, as compliance with the
247
state law did not make compliance with federal law impossible. Nor was there

235.

Id.

236.

Id.

237.

Id. at 1906-07 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion).

238.

Id. at 1907 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion).

239.

See id.

240.

Id.

241.

Id.

242.

Id. (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).

243.

Id. at 1909 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

244.

Id.

245.

Id.

246.

Id. at 1912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

247.

Id. at 1915-16 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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express preemption, as nothing in the statute’s text purported to preempt the law
248
at issue.
Consistent with her inclination not to inquire into legislative motive, Justice
Ginsburg pointed out that in no case so far had the Court truly rested preemption
249
on “the purposes for which state laws were enacted.” Likewise, she rejected Virginia Uranium’s assertion that the mining ban was preempted because it was a pre250
text for regulating the radiological safety hazards of milling and tailings storage.
The Justice also wrote that “[a] state law regulating an upstream activity within the State’s authority is not preempted simply because a downstream activity
251
falls within a federally occupied field.” In Justice Ginsburg’s view, legislative
motive was simply irrelevant. Maybe the Commonwealth’s mining ban was a pretext; maybe not. The Commonwealth simply was not regulating a preempted field.
Formally, Justice Ginsburg’s view is not so different from Justice Gorsuch’s: both
give state legislative motive no weight. But it is plausible that a nefarious state
purpose with threadbare pretextual cover might shift Justice Ginsburg’s calculus,
given her reluctance to completely disavow relying on state legislative purpose. Alternatively, purpose might become relevant if a state seeks to regulate an area already closely regulated by the federal government. But even there, under Justice
Ginsburg’s view, state legislative purpose would not seem to carry much weight, as
field and conflict preemption analyses based on the scope of the federal law in
question would suffice. Thus, despite differing rationales, six Justices did not give
state legislative purpose much importance.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and Alito, dissented and espoused a more traditional view consistent with preemption as “purposivism’s last
252
refuge.” In their view, the Commonwealth sought to improperly indirectly regulate a preempted field:
[T]he question we agreed to address is whether a State can purport to
regulate a field that is not preempted (uranium mining safety) as an indirect means of regulating other fields that are preempted (safety concerns
about uranium milling and tailings). And on that question, our precedent
is clear: The AEA prohibits state laws that have the purpose and effect of
253
regulating preempted fields.

248.

Id. at 1914 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

249.

Id. at 1913 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

250.

Id. at 1914 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

251.
(2012)).

Id. at 1914-15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452

252. See id. at 1916-20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). For an example of that view of preemption, see
Michael Ramsey, Note, Preemption as Purposivism’s Last Refuge, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (2013).
253.

See 139 S. Ct. at 1916 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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In their view, the uranium mining ban, although seemingly an exercise of traditional state power in a federally unregulated area, was in reality an attempt to regu254
late uranium milling and tailing due to radiological safety concerns. The dissenters argued that conflict is not necessary for preemption, but that a state law is
255
preempted “when its purpose is to regulate within a preempted field.”
The controlling opinions in Virginia Uranium further constrain the Court’s already-limited scrutiny of state motives set forth in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
256
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission. In Pacific Gas, the
Court rejected a preemption challenge to a California law that required adequate
storage space for nuclear waste as a condition for permitting a nuclear power plant.
The Court found that the Federal Atomic Energy Act covered the field of nuclear
safety concerns, and that for preemption analysis, it was therefore necessary to de257
termine whether there was a non-safety rationale for the state law. The state
maintained, and a committee report confirmed, that there was such a rationale—an
economic one, in that running out of storage space for fuel would lead to high costs
258
to contain the problem or address a reactor shutdown. The Court declined to
engage in further inquiry into whether the state’s true motives might have been
safety-based, given the state’s authority to halt the construction of new nuclear
259
plants on economic grounds.
The Court in Virginia Uranium noted that in Pacific Gas, the state law had directly prohibited a regulated activity. In Virginia Uranium, where the state law prohibited an activity “far removed” from the NRC’s powers, the Court declined to
260
take on even Pacific Gas-level scrutiny into the state’s motives.
It is entirely plausible that the Commonwealth of Virginia meant to curtail
nuclear safety harms and regulate the storage of nuclear waste in its borders when
it enacted its ban—even likely, given the extremely high economic value of mining
261
its uranium deposit. Yet six Justices from across the ideological spectrum found
the state law not preempted.

254.

See id. at 1917 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

255. Id. at 1917 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983)); see also id. at 1917-18 (“For example, even
though a State may generally regulate its roads, it may not shut down all of the roads to a nuclear power
plant simply because it disagrees with the NRC’s nuclear safety regulations.”).
256.

461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983).

257. Id. at 213 (“A state prohibition on nuclear construction for safety reasons would also be in
the teeth of the Atomic Energy Act’s objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for
widespread development and use and would be pre-empted for that reason”).
258.

Id.

259.

Id. at 216.

260.

Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1904-05 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion).

261. See Cale Jaffe, Virginia’s Uranium Mining Battle Flips Traditional Views of Federal and State
Power, CONVERSATION (Jan. 11, 2019), http://theconversation.com/virginias-uranium-mining-battleflips-traditional-views-of-federal-and-state-power-109167.
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Thus, on the issue of preemption there may be a jurisprudential alliance between the Court’s formalistic conservatives and the liberals more inclined to hewing close to the text. The conservative wing—and especially the Scalia-inspired,
ostensibly textualist wing—grew with the confirmation of Justice Kavanaugh and
may grow further yet. Conservatives are not the only potential allies of states,
though. For instance, it was noted that Justice Kagan at oral argument seemed to
262
share Justice Kavanaugh’s reluctance to intrude onto traditional state authority.
The result may be a freer rein for states in efforts to use their sovereignty to push
back against federal-level climate apathy.

B. Express Preemption and the “Relating To” Clauses
Express preemption of a state-based vehicle electrification mandate would be
grounded in either the CAA’s or EPCA’s “relating to” clauses.
The CAA forbids any state from enacting a “standard relating to the control
263
of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” EPCA
forbids enacting “a law or regulation related to fuel economy standards . . . for au264
tomobiles” when a federal standard covers the same vehicles.
A challenger could argue that a vehicle electrification mandate is “related to”
emissions (unlike gasoline powered cars, EVs do not have emissions) and point to
the broad language of CAA § 209(a) prohibiting state regulation “related to” emis265
sions. Likewise, a challenger could argue that a vehicle electrification mandate is
“related to” fuel economy standards and expressly proscribed under EPCA, on
grounds that an effect of a vehicle electrification mandate would likely be to im266
prove fuel economy.
“Related to” phrases in federal legislation have proven to be an interpretive
headache, and courts have construed this preemption language in federal statutes
267
with varying degree of breadth. The CAA’s “relating to” provision has been in268
terpreted in the preemption context. The Second Circuit held that Zero Emis-

262.

See id.

263.

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2018); see also supra Section II.B.1.

264.

49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018); see also supra Section II.B.2.

265.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).

266. It is not necessarily the case that electric vehicles are more fuel efficient than gasoline- or
diesel-powered vehicles. Electric vehicles vary widely in efficient use of fuel. See, e.g., Jim Gorzelany,
These Are the Electrified Rides That Are Rated as the Most Energy Efficient, MY EV,
https://www.myev.com/research/comparisons/evs-with-the-best-mpge-ratings-for-2019 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2020). It is entirely conceivable that upcoming electric vehicle models would be less fuel efficient than some fossil fuel vehicles. Electric vehicles would still have to satisfy the fuel economy standards (MPGe) set forth by the EPA. See supra note 180.
267.

See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 147, at 20-25.

268. See, e.g., Steven G. Davison, Regulation of Emission of Greenhouse Gases and Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Motor Vehicles, 1 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 1, 37-38 (2006).
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sion Vehicle (ZEV) regulations that were not covered by CAA § 177—which au269
thorizes states to adopt California’s standards instead of federal requirements —
constituted prohibited emissions standards under the CAA. In American Automobile
270
Manufacturers Ass’n v. Cahill, the court found that “the ZEV sales requirement
must be considered a standard ‘relating to the control of emissions.’ ZEV, after all,
stands for ‘zero-emission vehicle,’ and a requirement that a particular percentage of
vehicle sales be ZEVs has no purpose other than to effect a general reduction in
271
emissions.”
Unlike the proposed Washington legislation, the ZEV regulations in Cahill
were directed squarely at emissions. After all, it was in the name. A court would be
hard-pressed to conclude that a bill or regulation including the phrase “zeroemission” was not “related to” emissions. Electric vehicles were an emerging technology at the time, and their non-emissions related benefits that are the focus of
Washington’s bill were scarcely understood or considered. The New York legislation was designed to be essentially identical to a prior California law, adopted pursuant to California’s Clean Air Act waiver in explicit contemplation of emissions
272
reduction. The Washington legislation, in contrast, is aimed at other benefits
and purposes, and the emissions reductions are incidental. Vehicles are not directed to become zero-emission—they are directed to become electric. The legislation makes no mention of emissions-related benefits. Rather, the bases for the legislation are non-emissions-related ones, such as economic benefits, water quality,
273
and the like.
Under EPCA, Jonathan Adler argues that a requirement to sell zero emission
274
vehicles is likely not a requirement “relating to” fuel economy either. The Supreme Court has recognized limits on the scope of “related to” preemption language. In New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Court pointed out that “[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the
furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption

269.

Clean Air Act § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2018).

270.

152 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 1998).

271. Id. at 200. In a decision following the Second Circuit’s decision in American Automobile
Manufacturers Ass’n, the First Circuit in Association of International Automobile Manufacturers v. Mass.
Department of Environmental Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000), embraced a broad preemption
standard, finding that “whether a regulation effects a small or great impact on overall emissions levels is
a question of degree, not one of kind.”
272.

Am. Automobile Mfrs. Ass’n, 152 F.3d at 199.

273.

See supra Section I.D.3.

274. See Adler, supra note 109 (“The Trump Administration is on weaker ground insofar as it
seeks to prevent California from requiring automakers to sell Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEVs, i.e. electric cars) in the state. While ZEVs reduce greenhouse gas emissions, they reduce emissions of traditional pollutants as well. Thus, this requirement fits more comfortably into the relevant CAA criteria. For
the same reasons, I think it is difficult to argue that the ZEV requirements are preempted under the
EPCA as standards ‘related to’ fuel economy too.”).

_JCI_METZ_LONDON.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

470

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

7/2/2020 1:11 PM

[Vol. 9:2

would never run its course,” and this would “read the presumption against preemption out of the law whenever Congress speaks to the matter with generali275
ty.” Instead, the Court ruled that states should “go beyond the unhelpful text
and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the . . . statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress un276
derstood would survive.” The Court’s decision limited its previously broad con277
struction of the preemptive “related to” language of the federal ERISA statute.
278
In Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, a Vermont federal district court considered whether California emissions standards adopted by
Vermont under a pending EPA waiver were preempted under EPCA, which does
not have a state waiver process. The plaintiffs had argued that California’s waiver
under CAA § 209(b), and other states’ right to adopt California’s waiver under
CAA § 177, did not exempt either state’s regulation from preemption under the
279
EPCA of state regulation “related to” fuel economy standards.
The court in Green Mountain found that the Vermont statute was not
preempted, assuming California was granted an EPA waiver for its statute, given
the traditionally shared role of the federal government and the states in regulating
280
greenhouse gases (GHGs). Even though the regulation of fuel economy standards is one of the most important mechanisms for reducing GHGs from motor vehicles, the court rejected preemption on the basis that the Vermont rules were
broader than just fuel economy standards: they concerned not only carbon dioxide,
a direct waste product of fuel, but “carbon dioxide equivalents” too (that is, other
281
GHGs). Thus, the court reasoned, “while there is a near-perfect correlation between fuel consumed and carbon dioxide released, there is no such perfect correlation between fuel consumed and emissions of hydrocarbons or carbon monoxide,” a
fact which “undermines the assertion that the GHG regulation is nothing more

275. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655 (1995).
276. Id. at 656. The CAA is silent on electric vehicle mandates and the regulation of intrastate
energy distribution, storage, and use.
277. See Meltzer, supra note 147, at 20-21, 23. For example, the Court considered a state statute
that automatically revoked designations of spouses as beneficiaries of non-probate assets upon divorce.
Id. at 23. The Court found the law preempted because it would hypothetically require ERISA plan administrators to pay beneficiaries according to state law, which ERISA forbade. Id. But, as Justice Breyer
pointed out, such a broad interpretation would also seemingly preempt state slayer statutes, which bar
killers from receiving benefits from those they kill. Id.
278. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 343-89
(D. Vt. 2007).
279.

Id. at 301.

280.

Id. at 350.

281.

Id. at 352.
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than a fuel economy standard, since it encompasses emissions which do not corre282
late with fuel economy.”
New York Conference’s narrow reading of “related to” language was cited by the
court in Green Mountain, when it ruled that while the vehicle standards in question
affected fuel economy, the regulations were primarily directed at GHG emissions
283
and were not sufficiently related to fuel economy standards to be preempted.
In finding no de facto fuel economy regulation, the court noted, “Congress’s
undoubted intent was to make the setting of fuel economy standards exclusively a
federal concern, but it enacted EPCA against the backdrop of other regulations
that affected motor vehicles and could have an effect on fuel economy, such as
emissions standards under Section 202 of the CAA, emissions standards under
Section 209(b) of the CAA, motor vehicle safety standards and noise emission
284
standards. See Pub. L. No. 94-163, Sec. 502., Stat. (1975).”
Green Mountain, which came after the Supreme Court struck down diesel fleet
rules in EMA, illustrates how courts can narrowly construe the degree to which
federal and state statutes conflict, especially when the federal statute fails to explicitly prohibit state regulation in the field. With respect to the Washington legislation, a court following Green Mountain’s analysis could easily construe the preemption provision of the CAA and EPCA narrowly and find that electric vehicle
mandates are not within the scope of the statute.
285
Consider, too, the Court’s increasingly formalist and textualist leanings,
under which it would be reasonable to construe the EPCA, CAA, and the Washington legislation as regulating formally distinct spheres: fuel economy standards,
emissions control, and vehicle power sources, respectively. A judge faithful to this
view—a position that also tends to accompany a skepticism of expansive federal
power—could likewise conclude that had Congress wanted to forbid any legislation
with a mere “impact on” emissions or fuel economy standards, it could have done
so. Likewise, Congress could have forbidden any state legislation that “had the effect of a standard relating to” emissions or fuel economy. But Congress did not do
so, and to read “related to” to mean “touching upon” would read “related to” out of
286
the statute. At a minimum, Congress did not proscribe such legislation, and it
287
could have.

282.

Id. at 352.

283.

Id. at 398.

284.

Id. at 354.

285.

See supra note 262 and accompanying text.

286.

Cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992).

287. Would a court turn to the interpretation of the EPA or another federal agency of the “related to” sections in the CAA or EPCA? Probably not. There is a growing skepticism of deference to statutory interpretation by federal agencies. Recent decisions, including Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765,
1778-79 (2019) and Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113-14 (2018), have narrowed traditional Chevron deference to federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing the doctrine of deference to agencies); see also Joshua
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It has been argued that despite its supposed ideological constraints on judicial
288
decision-making, textualism leaves ample room for judicial value calls. The
phrase “relating to” is not unambiguous, either: Merriam-Webster’s dictionary
289
gives definitions as broad as meaning simply “about” or “connected to.” Further,
judicial realism can come into play, as in Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Virginia
Uranium, which pointed out that despite the Commonwealth’s legislation formally
being outside the scope of the AEA, it was in reality an indirect way to accomplish
290
the same goal. That said, the Chief Justice’s view in Virginia Uranium only gar291
nered three votes.
Regardless, the proposed Washington legislation on its face regulates the
mechanism of propulsion and power of vehicles for explicit purposes of benefiting
Washington’s economy, protecting plants, fish and wildlife, and preventing
groundwater contamination. In light of this textual anchoring, a court being consistent with the narrow view of preemption advanced by both Justices Gorsuch and
Ginsburg in Virginia Uranium would be hard-pressed to conclude that rather than
292
relating to those aspects, the bill relates to emissions.

* * *
The presumption against preemption underlies all preemption analysis. A precept of preemption law is that “when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible
of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfa293
vors pre-emption.’” A finding of preemption requires a “high threshold” to be
met “if a state law is to be pre-empted for conflicting with the purposes of a federal
294
Act. Any conflict must be ‘irreconcilable . . . .’” “[H]ypothetical or potential
295
conflict[s]” do not meet this threshold, and courts are heavily discouraged from

Matz, The Imminent Demise of Chevron Deference?, TAKE CARE (June 21, 2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-imminent-demise-of-chevron-deference (discussing the Court’s narrowing of Chevron).
288. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1260 (2015).
289. Relate To, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relate%20to
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
290.

See supra Section III.A.

291.

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1916 (2019).

292. Indeed, if it were, legislation “relating to emissions” would conceivably include anything
that would incidentally reduce or increase emissions, regardless of the main purpose: for instance, establishing new bike paths, funding public transportation, building new roads, removing old roads, timed
traffic lights, idling prohibitions, and the like.
293. Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S.
431, 449 (2005)).
294. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
295.

Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
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“seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly ex296
ists.”
The Court recently affirmed its reluctance to preempt state law, approvingly
citing language from Medtronic v. Lohr to the effect that “preemption of state laws
297
represents ‘a serious intrusion into state sovereignty.’”
In one case, the Supreme Court declined to apply the presumption against
preemption, but that case is distinguishable. In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California
298
Tax-Free Trust there was no ambiguity as to coverage of the express preemption
clause. The preemption clause applied to states, and the only question was whether
299
Puerto Rico was a state. The Court explained:
Resolving whether Puerto Rico is a “State” for purposes of the preemption provision begins “with the language of the statute itself,” and
that “is also where the inquiry should end,” for “the statute’s language is
plain.” And because the statute “contains an express pre-emption clause,”
we do not invoke any presumption against pre-emption but instead “focus
on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best ev300
idence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”
Whether Puerto Rico is a state subject to a preemption provision covering states is
a question of definition. In contrast, whether the Washington statute requiring
that vehicles be powered by electricity “relates to” vehicle emissions or fuel economy standards is a question of Congressional intent in crafting the CAA and
EPCA preemption provisions. In the case of the Washington legislation, the Court
would be more likely to find the lack of a “clear Congressional command” that it
301
found in Virginia Uranium, meriting a presumption against preemption.

C. Implied Preemption of Vehicle Electrification Legislation
Even if a federal statute does not explicitly preempt a state statute, a court can
invalidate a statute when preemption is implied through field preemption or con-

296.

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960).

297. Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1904 (2019) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996) (plurality opinion)).
298.

See Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016).

299. In Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, the express preemption provision forbade state municipal bankruptcy laws: namely, “a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of [a]
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition” and “a judgment
entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not consent to such composition.” Id. at
1945 (citations omitted). But was Puerto Rico a “State”? It was on this definitional question that the
Court rejected the presumption against preemption. See id. at 1945-46.
300.

See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1946 (citations omitted).

301.

Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1905.
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302

flict preemption. In field preemption, a federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room” for state
303
law. In conflict preemption, “compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility” or a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplish304
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

1. Field Preemption
Field preemption does not bar the Washington vehicle electrification mandate
for two key reasons: 1) the bill concerns traditional state functions, and the CAA
contemplates a role for state governments in air pollution control; and 2) even if
the federal government did occupy the entire field of emissions regulation, the
proposed Washington legislation does not regulate emissions.
Field preemption asks whether a state is trying to push its way into a field that
305
Congress has designated exclusively to the federal government. If so, the state is
out of luck. Absent explicit congressional intent, federal exclusivity may be inferred from a “pervasive” scheme of federal regulation that leaves “no room for a
state to supplement,” or if “the federal interest is so dominant” as to preclude en306
forcement of state laws on the same subject. Hesitation to infer field preemption
307
is warranted if the field touches on traditional state powers.
308
In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, the Supreme Court considered whether a
state cause of action for failure to include an anti-lock brake system (ABS) in the
design of tractor-trailers was preempted by federal truck safety law set forth in the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) and its implementing regulations. Pursuant to the Safety Act, the federal government issued
a standard imposing stopping distances for vehicles with air brakes that in effect
309
required tractor-trailers to have ABS devices. After a court decision rejected the
standard on a finding that the ABS devices potentially created additional hazards,
the standard was amended to so that stopping-distance requirements no longer ap310
plied to tractor-trailers.

302. The Supreme Court has described field preemption “as a species of conflict pre-emption: A
state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either express or plainly
implied) to exclude state regulation.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 n.5 (1990).
303.

Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).

304.

Id.

305.

See English, 496 U.S. at 79.

306.

Id.

307.

Id.

308.

Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995).

309.

Id. at 284-85.

310.

Id. at 285.
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In addressing the question of field preemption, the Court found that, although the Safety Act covered the field of motor vehicle safety standards, there
was no conflict between federal and state law because the Safety Act failed to ad311
dress the need for ABS devices. The Court noted that the standard “has nothing
to say concerning ABS devices one way or the other,” and the federal government
312
had not ordered truck manufacturers to refrain from using ABS devices. It added, “[a] finding of liability against petitioners would undermine no federal objec313
tives or purposes with respect to ABS devices, since none exist.”
The Washington legislation could be defended on a similar basis. Just as the
state standard in Freightliner required tractor-trailers to be manufactured with a certain feature (antilock brakes) not explicitly covered in the federal law on highway
safety, so the Washington legislation requires light duty vehicles to be manufactured with a certain feature (an electric power system) neither mandated nor prohibited by the CAA or EPCA.
The Supreme Court has avoided finding preemption of state regulation in areas traditionally within state control when not directly contrary to the express
314
terms of a federal statute. In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court upheld a state law
conditioning construction approval for nuclear power plants on availability of ade315
quate storage and disposal facilities. The Court found that the Federal Atomic
Energy Act “occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited
316
powers expressly ceded to the States.” Therefore the test of pre-emption was
whether “the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regu317
lated by the Federal Act.” It noted that a state prohibition or moratorium on nuclear construction grounded on safety concerns would fall “squarely within the
318
prohibited field.” However, if the state prohibition was grounded on non-safety
319
concerns, it would not be preempted.
Because regulation of power generation relating to need, reliability, and cost
had traditionally been left to the states, and because California’s law purported to
regulate on economic grounds, the Court applied the Atomic Energy Act’s

311.

Id. at 289.

312.

Id.

313.

Id. at 289-90.

314.

461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983).

315.

See id. at 205.

316. Id. at 212-13. The federal law’s savings clause stated, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards.” Id. at 210.
317.

Id. at 213 (citation omitted).

318.

Id.

319.

See id. at 216.
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320

preemption provision relating to safety regulation narrowly. In effect, it found
that state economic grounds for prohibiting construction of a nuclear plant could
provide a sufficient basis for rejecting preemption, despite a federal statute covering the field of radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and opera321
tion of a nuclear plant.
322
In Virginia Uranium, the Supreme Court held that because the AEA did not
specifically preempt uranium mining regulation, Virginia’s law was not preempted.
The Court reached this result even though the ban affected aspects of the uranium
refinement process that were regulated by the AEA, and even though the plaintiff
had alleged that avoidance of these federally preempted aspects was the reason that
323
the state had passed the uranium mining ban in the first instance.
In the case of vehicle electrification legislation, the state of Washington can
show numerous state regulatory interests addressed by the proposal. These interests, cited in the first section of the legislation, include:
1) Job creation and economic development benefits of charging network
buildout;
2) Consumer savings from reduced vehicle maintenance costs and
downward pressure on electric utility rates;
3) Ability for electric vehicle batteries to serve as electrical grid load
balancing and energy storage resources;
4) Reduced soil and groundwater pollution;
Increased electricity generation; and
324
5) Lower electric rates.
The CAA is silent on all these benefits, none of which relates to vehicle emissions,
and which together constitute a sufficient independent legal basis for avoiding
preemption.
The proposed Washington legislation would have an extensive impact on electrical generation and use. States have primary jurisdiction over regulation of intra325
state electricity generation and distribution. If viewed as a measure to enhance
intrastate power markets, the statute would fall squarely within a traditional area of
state policy and regulatory dominance.
Furthermore, it can be argued that given that the CAA (and EPCA) was
passed long prior to electric vehicles becoming a viable transportation option,

320. Id.; see also Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599-1600 (2015) (state antitrust
claims against gas pipeline companies were not field preempted because while the Natural Gas Act regulates wholesale prices of natural gas, retail price regulation is a state function).
321.

Id.

322.

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion).

323.

See id. at 1902-04.

324.

See supra Section I.D.3.

325. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767-68
(2016) (FPA does not permit FERC to regulate intrastate energy commerce).
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preempting states’ rights to mandate electrification could not have been the “clear
326
and manifest purpose of Congress.” Likewise, finding field preemption here
would mean looking beyond the text of the CAA and declaring that the “field” in
question was not emissions, but methods of propulsion, despite the Act’s silence on
this matter.
327
Consider also the purpose provisions and the savings clause in the CAA.
The CAA did not reserve even air pollution control exclusively to the federal government, and, indeed, it explicitly acknowledged that state and local governments
328
played a role. In so declaring, the CAA sought to encourage state acts “con329
sistent with the provisions of [the CAA], for pollution prevention.” This cannot
be squared with a view that Congress meant to occupy the field entirely.
Even if Congress did occupy the field of emissions, field preemption wouldn’t
proscribe regulation upstream of the preempted field, such as a requirement for
electric propulsion. Again, Virginia Uranium is telling. There, the Commonwealth
regulated uranium mining, which was upstream of the federally occupied field of
330
disposal of nuclear mining waste. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Virginia Uranium concurrence, “A state law regulating an upstream activity within the State’s
authority is not preempted simply because a downstream activity falls within a
331
federally occupied field.”

2. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption is also unlikely. There is no actual conflict between the
federal legislation and the Washington bill—indeed, compliance with both is
straightforward, and there is insufficient statutory text to ground an “obstacle” that
the Washington bill would create.
A state law is invalid under the principle of conflict preemption if it actually
conflicts with a federal statute or regulation. Even without actual conflict, a state
law is invalid if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
332
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” But mere state-federal “tension”

326. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230).
327.

See supra Section II.B.1.

328.

See supra Section II.B.1.

329.

42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2012).

330.

See supra Section III.A.

331.

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1915 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

332. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987); Virginia Uranium, 138 S. Ct. at 1907
(Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion). But see Meltzer, supra note 147, at 35 (describing Justice Thomas’s
criticism of obstacle preemption generally).

_JCI_METZ_LONDON.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

478

7/2/2020 1:11 PM

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 9:2

isn’t enough to constitute an obstacle for preemption purposes, especially if a state
333
is exercising its traditional police powers.
A state statute is not shielded from (nor subjected to) preemption merely be334
cause it expresses a different objective than the federal statute. To the extent
that the state statute intrudes upon Congressional objectives as expressed by the
335
federal statute, it is preempted. Nevertheless, a finding of conflict preemption
“turns on the identification of ‘actual conflict,’” and a court “should not find pre336
emption too readily in the absence of clear evidence of a conflict.” Yet the rules
are not clear cut, as what constitutes a sufficient obstacle to ground preemption is
“‘a matter of judgment,’ to be informed by reference to the overall federal statutory
337
scheme.”
Opponents of the Washington legislation would likely argue that section 209
of the CAA contemplates federal-only emission standards, with exceptions only for
338
California via waiver and the section 177 states. Under this view, the purpose of
section 209 of the CAA would be frustrated by a state law that mandates vehicle
electrification, because it would have an effect on emissions. Under this theory, only
the federal government could regulate anything to do with auto emissions, and the
proposed Washington bill, which would have an impact on emissions, would result
in an unwanted fracturing of the national vehicle emission standards.
But this is a stretch, much like the one that proved too far for the Court in
Virginia Uranium. There, the plaintiff contended that conflict preemption arose
from the Commonwealth of Virginia’s regulation of uranium mining. Virginia
Uranium argued that regulation upset the cost-benefit balance that Congress had
339
imposed via a uniform regulatory scheme. And the Court rejected that argument
as “simplistic,” declaring that finding preemption would “elevate abstract and un340
enacted legislative desires above state law.” Here, as in Virginia Uranium, there
simply isn’t clear statutory text to indicate that a state vehicle electrification regulation would upset some imagined Congressional balance.
Further, consider the statutory context of the CAA. First, the overriding purpose of the Clean Air Act is to clean the air, not mandate a 100%-unified vehicle

333. Affordable Hous. Found. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 241-42 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1948), and Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 544 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)).
334. See N.Y. State Comm’n on Cable Television v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 669 F.2d 58, 62
(2d Cir. 1982) (courts “look to the effect, rather than the purpose of the state law”).
335.

Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).

336.

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-85 (2000).

337.

Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).

338. See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295,
301-02 (D. Vt. 2007).
339. Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion);
see also supra text accompanying notes 238-42.
340.

Id.
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market (and certainly not to unnecessarily perpetuate emissions). The existence
of CAA § 177, which allows states to adopt California’s waiver-authorized standards instead of federal ones, further undercuts uniform-intent arguments. To base
conflict preemption on a perceived uniformity rationale would commit doubly the
342
sin that Justice Gorsuch warned of in Virginia Uranium —it would require inferring the purpose of Congress (to create uniformity) and the purpose of the state
(to destroy uniformity). After all, Congress less likely intended to create a 100%
unified market than to allow states to experiment in ways that may incidentally
343
improve air pollution. As Justice Gorsuch wrote in Virginia Uranium,
[t]rying to discern what motivates legislators individually and collectively
invites speculation and risks overlooking the reality that individual Members of Congress often pursue multiple and competing purposes, many of
which are compromised to secure a law’s passage and few of which are
fully realized in the final product . . . . In disregarding these legislative
compromises, we may only wind up displacing perfectly legitimate state
laws on the strength of ‘purposes’ that only we can see, that may seem
perfectly logical to us, but that lack the democratic provenance the Con344
stitution demands before a federal law may be declared supreme.
Second, the Clean Air Act is concerned with pollution controls on polluting vehi345
cles, and is not intended to block laws advancing electric vehicles. The Washington legislation is consistent with the broad purposes of the CAA, which, as noted,
aims to reduce air pollution and explicitly contemplates state and local involvement
346
in doing so.
And finally, there is no frustration of purpose. Automakers have already stated
347
an intent to build a wide range of electric cars in numerous vehicle categories,
348
and the technology to do so is widely available. Compliance would neither be an

341.

See supra Section II.B.1.

342.

See supra Section III.A.

343. See supra Section II.B.1; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009) (rejecting
preemption in a prescription warning label tort case even though it meant different states would have
different labeling requirements).
344. Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1907-08 (Gorsuch, J.) (plurality opinion); cf. id. at 1915
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (rejecting “delicate balance” preemption argument because Congress had not
regulated in the allegedly preempted area and thus had struck no balance at all).
345.

See supra Section II.B.1.

346.

See supra Section II.B.1.

347. E.g., Mark Matousek, 40 Electric Cars You’ll See on the Road by 2025, BUS. INSIDER (July 10,
2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/electric-cars-that-will-be-available-by-2025-2018-1; Zachary
Shahan, World’s 10 Biggest Automakers & Their EV Plans, CLEANTECHNICA (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://cleantechnica.com/2018/10/29/worlds-10-biggest-automakers-their-ev-plans/.
348.
ing text.

Tesla, for instance, permits competitors to use its patents. See supra note 77 and accompany-

_JCI_METZ_LONDON.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

480

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

7/2/2020 1:11 PM

[Vol. 9:2

undue burden, nor would it result in impossible-to-meet, inconsistent vehicle
standards.
Here, there is no clear conflict between the Washington bill and federal law.
Automakers can make electric vehicles that comply with both state and federal
laws. In fact, the Washington legislation does not require special modifications for
Washington as it is expected that long before the legislation would go into effect,
349
automakers will have multiple offerings of electric cars in all vehicle classes.
There is no evidence that the CAA intended to impose the absurd requirement
that vehicles have at least some emissions. Accordingly, no sufficient preemptive
conflict exists.

3. The Irrelevance of State Legislative Intent
In field and conflict preemption analysis, a court could use state legislative intent to favor preemption. That is, a court might perceive state legislative intent to
stretch the scope of the state-regulated field, or might discern state legislative intent to infer a conflict or obstacle.
In the context of a vehicle electrification mandate, a challenger to the Washington legislation could maintain that the electrification requirement is simply an
emissions or fuel-economy regulation in disguise—an impermissible strategy to
350
control emissions and improve fuel economy in furtherance of a state goal of reducing vehicle emissions.
Such a challenge would ask the court to scrutinize the motives behind the state
legislation, since the text itself is devoid of any such intent. The outcome of a “motives” challenge is uncertain, but a court faithful to the increasing influence of conservative textualism and federalism should reject it.
When it comes to the scope of preemption, scrutinizing Congress’s intent by
351
considering legislative history is sometimes a part of the analysis. But Justice
Thomas and others have critiqued the pervasive use of federal legislative history
352
for peering into legislative motives in a preemption analysis.

349. See, e.g., GM Technology Paves the Way for an All-Electric Future, GEN. MOTORS,
https://www.gm.com/our-stories/technology/gm-technology-paves-the-way-for-an-all-electric-future.html
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019); Paul A. Eisenstein & Ashley Turner, Ford CEO Hackett Reassures Investors of
EV Plans as It Pours Money into Electric F-150, ‘Mustang-Inspired’ Crossover, CNBC (May 9, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/09/ford-ceo-hackett-reassures-investors-as-it-pours-money-into-evs.html.
350. Note that electric vehicles can be fuel-inefficient, and therefore mandating that all vehicles
be electric would not necessarily have the effect of improving fuel economy. See supra note 266.
351. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (“Inquiries into congressional
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation,
the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because
the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of
misreading Congress’ purpose.”) (footnote omitted); see also Meltzer, supra note 147, at 22-23 (noting
examples of even Justices Scalia and Thomas using purposive approaches in the preemption context).
352.

Meltzer, supra note 147, at 22-23.

_JCI_METZ_LONDON.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2020]

7/2/2020 1:11 PM

481

State Vehicle Electrification Mandates

Scrutinizing state legislative intent is another story. Federalism disfavors a
federal court intruding on state power by looking into state legislative motives. In
Virginia Uranium, Justice Gorsuch, writing for a plurality, warned against courts
inquiring into state legislative motives when considering preemption challenges:
Consider just some of the costs to cooperative federalism and individual
liberty we would invite by inquiring into state legislative purpose too
precipitately. The natural tendency of regular federal judicial inquiries into state legislative intentions would be to stifle deliberation in state legislatures and encourage resort to secrecy and subterfuge. That would inhibit the sort of open and vigorous legislative debate that our Constitution
recognizes as vital to testing ideas and improving laws . . . [F]ederal
courts would risk subjecting similarly situated persons to radically different legal rules as judges uphold and strike down materially identical state
regulations based only on the happenstance of judicial assessments of the
353
“true” intentions lurking behind them.
354

Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined in this portion of the opinion. Despite
the three concurring liberal justices’ reluctance to agree with this reasoning, it
seems hard to square their agreement in the result with willingness to consider
state legislative purpose. After all, it appeared entirely plausible that the Commonwealth of Virginia had sought to indirectly regulate what it could not direct355
356
ly. (If state legislative purpose wasn’t informative then, when would it be?).
Alternatively, the justices might simply be willing to give states the benefit of the
doubt when there are multiple plausible legislative purposes. Indeed, state legislative intent matters less under the Court’s evolving formalist and federalist preemp357
tion jurisprudence, as seen through Virginia Uranium.

CONCLUSION
State-based vehicle electrification mandates are a promising strategy for moving beyond gasoline-powered vehicles. There are solid legal arguments, rooted in
precedent, that such legislation would not be preempted under the CAA or EPCA.
But precedent isn’t everything. Legal precedent is receiving less deference in
358
recent years, especially at the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Court has recently

353.

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1906 (2019) (plurality opinion).

354.

Id. at 1900.

355.

See supra Section III.A.

356. Accord Virginia Uranium, 139. S. Ct. at 1919 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If such a statute
does not ‘target’ or ‘seek to regulate’ a preempted field, what would? . . . [A] purpose inquiry is most
useful precisely when the challenged state law does not purport to regulate a preempted field.”).
357.

See supra Section III.A.

358. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Conservatives Overturn Precedent as Liberals Ask
‘Which Cases the Court Will Overrule Next’, WASH. POST (May 13, 2019),
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overturned a number of longstanding precedents. Nonetheless, despite the uncertainty of relying on precedent, states have a good case for avoiding preemption.
The growing conservative textualist wing of the Court is skeptical of an expansive
approach to preemption, as evidenced most recently in Justice Gorsuch’s opinion
in Virginia Uranium v. Warren. Nonetheless, because preemption is highly subjective there is a risk that vehicle electrification legislation might fail.
All told, it is worthwhile to pursue state-level vehicle electrification mandates,
despite the legal uncertainty, for the following reasons:
1) The statutes may be upheld, in which case states will realize enormous benefits from vehicle electrification;
2) The introduction and passage of legislation paves the way for federal
vehicle electrification legislation or rulemaking; and
3) State-level vehicle electrification mandates signal to automakers,
governments, investors, and businesses that popular will for such
mandates is building, thereby accelerating and promoting investment
in EVs and EV battery technology and charging infrastructure for an
electrified transportation system.
In sum, given serious questions regarding whether a vehicle electrification mandate
is an emissions regulation, strong, non-emissions-related reasons for the proposed
Washington legislation, and the unsettled, case-by-case nature of preemption analysis, there are multiple pathways by which a court could uphold the Washington
bill consistent with existing precedent. Indeed, the environmentally friendly vehicle-electrification movement may find itself to be strange bedfellows with the
Court’s increasingly influential formalist and federalist conservative wing. Given
the magnitude of the climate crisis, it is appropriate to move forward with state
vehicle electrification legislation without excessive deference to ambiguous precedent from past decades.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courts-conservatives-overturnprecedent-as-liberals-ask-which-cases-the-court-will-overrule-next/2019/05/13/b4d3c4f8-7595-11e9bd25-c989555e7766_story.html.
359. See, e.g., id. (discussing court’s 5-4 overruling in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct.
1485 (2019), of longstanding principle from Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), regarding state-vsstate sovereign immunity); see generally BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45319,
THE SUPREME COURT’S OVERRULING OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45319.pdf (reviewing stare decisis at the Court and cataloguing overrulings of precedent).

